THE NIGERIAN MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA NIGERIA 1999-2009

ABSTRACT

The  study  examines  the  constraints  faced  by  the  Nigerian  military  in  carrying   out counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria between 1999 and 2009. The study argues that there are significant problems in relying on conventional forces to engage in specialized COIN operations like the insurgency in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian military commitment to specialized COIN appeared negligible and it more often than not regarded its mission in the Niger Delta essentially in conventional military terms. As long as the COIN lasted, the military organization appeared  to have been reluctant  in changing the acceptable ways of conventional military operations, especially at the tactical level. Indeed, the Nigerian military COIN operation in the Niger Delta was distinguished more by its conventionality than by its adaptiveness.  Consequently,  continuity rather than change defined the COIN operations of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta. Such continuity was made possible by the Nigerian military bandwidth problem and the Nigerian military organization. A unconventional coastal insurgency in a complex and difficult terrain was a significant departure from conventional war preparedness the Nigerian military were often exposed to in their training, composition and structure. Indeed, the entire military organization had to adapt and learn fast in response to changing  realities  evident  in the Niger  Delta  insurgency.  The  Niger  Delta  insurgency required  innovation  and  adaptation,  but  the  Nigerian  military  were  constrained  by slow institutional modifications made possible by an overwhelming military bandwidth problem. In all, the Niger Delta insurgency was a new kind of war for the Nigerian military. In such a war,  the  Nigerian  military  was  constrained  by  military  bureaucracy  and  a  democratic government almost to the point of ineffectiveness. The study submits that COIN operations invariably   faced   constraints    when   conventional   oriented    military   assumes    COIN responsibilities without making appropriate re-organisation to its force projection.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study

Contemporary military history of the Niger Delta of Nigeria shows that the Nigerian military has been actively involved in counterinsurgency. A background of the geopolitics1  of the  Niger  Delta  becomes  necessary  to  explain  why the  Nigerian  military  assumed  such

responsibility for a role that would have passed for a police job. The geopolitics of the Niger Delta  projects  it  as  the  single  richest  geographical  region  in Africa.2It  wasas  navigable waterways that the rivers of the Niger Delta became so important in the economic history of modern Nigeria.3Historically known as the Slave Coast and later as the Oil Rivers, the area was chiefly remarkable among British West African possessions for the exceptional facilities

which they offered for penetrating the interior by means of large and navigable streams and by a wonderful system of natural canalization which connects all the branches of the lower Niger by means of deep creek.4

However, in contemporary political history of Nigeria, the term Niger Delta has taken

on so many definitions in Nigeria that the actual meaning is almost lost to the politics  of opportunism. In one broad sense, it refers to oil bearing areas of Nigeria, while in another rather restrictive sense it is employed to describe the ethnographic area with a peculiar ethnic make-up  viz: Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo,  Isoko, Ogoni, Eleme, Ibibio,  Ikwere,  Kalabari,  Efik,

Okirika, Andoni, the Obolo and Opobian as well as Etche, Ekpeye, Ogba, Egbema, Engenne

1The Niger Delta geopolitics is rooted in history. Geopolitics in this sense captures the relationship between geography and politics as it affects the governance of space. The Niger Delta is a peculiar geography with abundant hydro-carbon resources whose importance to the Nigerian economy has attracted various political definition, re-definition, interpretation, re-interpretation and delimitation. Consequently, various social movements (violent and non-violent) with dynamic interests have struggled for the exclusive control of the region with the Nigerian state.

2Otoabasi Akpan, The Niger Delta Question and the Peace Plan (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2011), 22.

3Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and

Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 19.

4F.O.84/1882, “Memorandum by Consul H. H. Johnston on the British Protectorate of the Oil Rivers, Part II,” in

Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 19-20.

and Abua.5  These body of controversy on the actual area that constitutes the Niger Delta has given rise to terms like the “historical  Niger  Delta,”  the “political  Niger  Delta”  and the “geographical Niger Delta.”

Figure: Historical Map of the Niger Delta

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

The historical Niger Delta is restricted to the areas now covered by five states namely; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Rivers States. It follows the original description of the Niger Delta as given by the Willink Commission of 1958.6  This description does not include the Igbo-speaking areas of Abia and Imo states as well as the Yoruba area of Ondo state as it is today.7  This leaves the Niger Delta comprising Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Edo states. Historically, Benin, as an area, came into the picture of the Niger Delta on February 22, 1890 when the term “Oil Rivers Protectorate” was employed in

5Steve Azaiki, Oil, Gas and Life in Nigeria(Ibadan: Y-Books, 2007), 192.

6N.A.I., Sir Henry Willink, Chairman, and 3 others: Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the

Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them, H.M.S.O., 1958, CE/W3.

7Otoabasi Akpan, The Niger Delta Question…, 6.

the instructions issued by the Secretary of State under the Order in Council of October 15

1899.8

The political Niger Delta enlarges the scope of the geographical and historical Niger Delta to include all oil bearing states found in the South-South, South-East and South West region of the country. To this end, the present Niger Delta is made up of nine oil bearing states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states) out of  the  thirty-six  states  in  Nigeria.  It  equally  has  one   hundred  and  eighty-five  local government areas out of a total of seven hundred and seventy-four local government areas in

Nigeria9(see Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.2: Map of Nigeria Showing the nine states of the Niger Delta

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

8G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 78.

9Otoabasi Akpan,The Niger Delta Question…, 6.

Figure 1.3: Land and Population of the Niger Delta

States	Land        Area (Sq/m)	Population	Males	Females	Capitals	No.   of LGs
Abia	6,320	2,845,380	1,430,298	1,415,082	Umuahia	17
A/Ibom	7,081	3,902,051	1,983,202	1,983,202	Uyo	31
Bayelsa	10,773	1,704,515	874,083	830,432	Yenagoa	8
C/River	20,156	2,892,988	1,471,967	1,421,021	Calabar	18
Delta	17,698	4,112,445	2,069,309	2,043,136	Asaba	25
Edo	17,802	3,233,366	1,633,946	1,599,420	Benin	18
Imo	5,530	3,927,563	1,976,471	1,951,092	Owerri	16
Ondo	15,500	3,460,877	1,745,057	1,715,820	Akure	18
Rivers	11,077	5,198,716	2,673,026	2,525,690	P/Harcourt	23
Total (9)	111,937	31,277,901	15,857,359	15,420,542	9	185

Source:National  Population Commission,  2009 Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 2.

Vol. 96, February 2, 2009

The geographical Niger Delta has been argued to be the “Delta of the Niger,” made up of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states and shaped by River Niger and its tributaries.10  Advocates of this position argue that not minding the fact that some oil bearing states in the southern

part of Nigeria  share certain  environmental  problems  in common  with the people  of  the geographical Niger Delta region, they are not located in the Delta of the Niger. As such, it remains a delusion to include them as a part of the Niger Delta.11  The  geographical Niger Delta is divided into two zones namely; the central and western Delta. The central Delta is made up of today’s Bayelsa and Rivers States. The indigenous people of the two states are

the Ijaw, Ikwerre, Okrika, Ogoni and Opobo.12  The western Delta has historically been the

10Ibid.,8.

11T. T. Tamuno, “The Geographical Niger Delta,” (Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the

Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organizedby the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta

University, Yenagoa, Wilberforce Island, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, University of Missouri-Kansas City, at Bayelsa State, 11th-13th March, 2008), 917.

12G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers…., 78.

region of today’s Delta state and its people include the Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ijaw, Isoko, Aboh and Ukwuani.13  The people of the Western Delta can further be divided into  two groups: “lower Delta, the home of the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Aboh; and the upper Delta inhabited by the Isoko, Urhobo and Ukwuani.”14

The denominator reality is that the Niger Delta, from the slave trade era, has evolved over time to fit into the changing and dynamic nature of Nigeria’s geopolitical configuration. The Niger Delta, serving as an orbit and domain for internal and external commerce, grew in

importance and became a significant trading centre on the Atlantic seaboard.15The slave trade

had significant effects on the internal political, social, demographic and economic history of the  Niger  Delta.  For  instance,  the  slave  trade  accelerated  the  transformation  of  fishing villages to City States.16

The  House  System  (a  peculiar  socio-political  system  in  the  Niger  Delta)  also

responded to the needs of the trade in palm oil. The opportunities and challenges created by the overseas trade induced the inhabitants of the Niger Delta cities to make structural changes which accounted for the social, political and economic institutions of the City States. With the waning of the slave trade due to the British naval blockade after 1839  and the copious slave-trade  treaties  between  1839  and  the  1850s,  the  trade  in  palm  oil  had  grown  in profitability heralding the disappearance  of the overseas slave trade  by the middle of the

nineteenth century.17

13C. Ogbogbo, “Identity Politics and Resource Control Conflict in the Niger Delta,” in Society, State, and

Identity in African History, ed. BahruZewde (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2008), 264.

14Obaro Ikime, “The People and Kingdoms of the Delta Province,” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, ed. ObaroIkime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), 89.

15Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 20

16Once the slave trade across the Atlantic began, the hinterland communities were attempted to the coast, coming down in voluntary migrations to take up places in the Delta suitable as ports for the trade. This

immigrant population converted the  fishing  villages into  City-States in  the period  1450-1800. Additional increment to the population of these states were made through the purchases of slaves, especially during the 19th C. See, Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, and Robin Horton, “From Fishing to City-State: A Social History of New Calabar,” in Man in Africa,eds. M. Douglas and P. M. Kaberry (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969), 37-58.

17Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 1.

To this end, Dike identifies two periods of European activity in the Niger Delta: first, a period beginning with the advent of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century to the British abolition   of   the   slave   trade   in   1807   and   second,   the   period   1807-1885.   This perioddistinguishes between the slave trade and trade in palm oil and kernels. To this a third and contemporary period can be added: the era of crude oil trade since the twentieth century.

In its contemporary profile, the once busy and rich slave and palm oil coast stands out as a busy hydrocarbon hub of Nigeria. Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in

1956, the Niger Delta has been in the forefront of energy and security concerns.Crude oil which is solely mined in the region accounts for about 95 percent of the country’s foreign exchange  earnings.18   The  management  of  such  overwhelming  deposits  of  hydrocarbons, which accounts for the main source of foreign exchange earnings inNigeria, has resulted in strained social and political relations and at several times violence in the Niger Delta.

A constant  observation  in the evolution  of the Niger Delta has been the  apparent relationship  between resource  abundance  and conflicts  in the Niger Delta.  This has been evident in the slave trade, palm oil era and crude oil era. During the slave trade and palm oil trade  era,  relative  abundance  of  natural  resources  (slaves  and  later  palm  oil)  has  been connected  with  broad-based  socio-economic  and  political  problems.  The  crude  oil  era appeared to have added a significant dimension to, but not a departure from, this established relationship. The crude oil era witnessed  “loot-seeking” rebellion and armed violence at an organized scale. Consequently, the Nigerian state has reacted in sufficient ways in an attempt to clamp upon the activities of various deviant social actors employing insurgency as means to attain objectives. In contemporary military parlance, the reaction of the Nigeria state has

been tagged counterinsurgency and has been basically carried out by the Nigerian military.

18A. O. Babatunde, “Oil Exploration, Armed Conflict and their Implications for Women’s Socio-economic Development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” in Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, ed. Isaac Olawale Albert, Willie AziegbeEselebor and Natheniel D. Danjibo   (Abuja: Society for Peace Studies and Practice,

2012), 258

Historically,  insurgency and counter  insurgency  (I-COIN)  in the Niger  Delta  cuts across three periods of Nigeria history and historiography: pre-colonial, colonial, and post- independence.  It also cut across three distinct epochs of Nigeria economic  history:  slave trade, staple commerce and petroleum economy. Insurgency has been a central and enduring phenomenon  in  the  Niger  Delta  from  the  era  of  the  slave  trade,  staple  commerce  and petroleum economy. It is a form of violent protest, or a highest stage of the manifestation of dissident. The need to dominate trade in the Niger Delta (slave and commodity trade) was an important factor in the conquest of the Niger Delta areas by Britain. At various times, such move to bring the indigenous people of the region under British suzerainty met with insurgent reaction.  From  1894  to  1895,  King  William  Koko  of  Nembe  resisted  the  Royal  Niger Company’s attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the lucrative trade in palm oil. In January 1895, over a  thousand  warriors  led by King William  Koko  from  Nembe  raided Akassa, killed  workers, sacked the town and destroyed the company’s workshop, machines

and stores.19  The Akassa  raid on the Royal Niger Company (RNC) headquarters  in  1895

represented manifestation of insurgency against external elements in the Niger Delta.

A significant aspect of counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta during that period  was carried out by the Oil Rivers Irregulars established in 1885 and later metamorphosed into the Oil Rivers Constabulary in 1891 and renamed the Niger Coast Constabulary in 1893. The Niger  Coast  Constabulary,  a military force made  up of an indigenous  Nigerian  recruited population,  carried  out  counterinsurgency  roles  during  the Akassa  raid  in 1895  when  in support of the British Royal Navy attacked Nembe in an epic battle.20  They also carried out COIN role againstKing Nana Olomu of Itsekiri (1896), Oba Ovonramwen of Benin (1897),

19See,   N.A.I., A. F. P. Newns, “An Intelligence Report on the Akassa Clan in Degema Division, Owerri

Province,” CSO 26, 1935, File 31016; E. J. Alagoa, The Akassa Raid, 1895 (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press,

1960); Tekena N. Tamuno, “Some Aspects of Nigerian Reaction to the Imposition of British Rule,” Journal of the Historical Society of NigeriaIII, no. II (1965); TekenaTamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914(London: Longman, 1972); Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982).

20E. J. Alagoa, The Akassa Raid, 1895 (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press), 1960.

the  Ekumeku   Movement   of  1902,  and  “Women’s   War”  of  1929.21    In  1901,   these constabulary forces became incorporated into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) that was   later   designated   the   Northern   Nigeria   Regiment   and   the    Southern   Nigeria Regiment.22Upon  amalgamation  in 1914, it survived as the Nigerian Regiment which was

later renamed Queens Own Regiment (QOR) in 1956 and thereafter the Nigerian Military

Force (NMF). In 1960, when Nigeria attained independence,  the NMF became the  Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) and in 1963 when Nigeria attained the status of a republic, the RNA changed to the Nigerian Army.

It is safe to state that as an institution, the Nigerian military has evolved over time. It emerged at different periods of Nigerian history as part of the overall process of evolution and consolidation of the Nigerian state. Within the geographical space of the Niger Delta, the military gained  peculiar  experiences  in counterinsurgency  operations.  However,  given the peculiarity  of  the  Niger  Delta  terrain,  the  counterinsurgency  operations  of  the  evolving Nigerian military assumed an amphibious character (land and sea based operations). By 1964, the Nigeria military had attained the status of a tri-service institution made up of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

As a legitimate establishment structured to dispense violence, the Nigerian military has been used at various times as an instrument of conflict resolution and as a credible means to defend the national interest of the country. Technically, the Nigerian military is deployed for security purposes.23  It is saddled with the responsibility of defending the country against internal subversion and external attacks. Section 217 of the Constitution spells out the roles

of Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). Section 217 sub Section 2(c) specifically saddles  the

21C. Osakwe and U. E. Umoh, “Militancy, Amnesty and Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta Region of

Nigeria,” Sokoto Journal of History (SJH) 1, (2012): 115.

22Ekaete Afahakan, “History of the Nigerian Army, 1860-1960”(Undergraduate Project, University of Uyo, Nigeria, 2008), 25.

23Otoabasi Akpan, the Niger Delta Question…, 155.

AFN with the responsibility of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president.24

Severally, this post-independence constitutional role of the Nigerian military has been put to test in the Niger Delta.In February 1966, Isaac Boro led a 12 day insurgency in the Niger  Delta  which  was  quelled  by  the  Nigerian  military.25During  the  Nigerian  Civil

War(1967-1970),  the  Nigerian  military  under  the  3rd   Marine  Commando  Division  was

deployed to suppress Biafran secessionist aspirations in the Niger Delta area of Bonny, Port Harcourt,  Calabar,  etc.26The  Nigerian  military,  especially  its  naval  component  has  been stationed in the Niger Delta, especially in the open waters of Escravos and Forcados in the Atlantic littoral. The army component of the Nigerian military have had  close contact with Niger Delta as they perform several auxiliary roles of guarding critical oil infrastructure and in  recent  times  personnel  of  Multinational  Oil  Companies  (MNOCs)  and  government officials operating in the Niger Delta.

The resurgence of insurgence in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009 brought the Nigerian military counterinsurgency skill to test once more. In November 1999, the Nigerian military was deployed to the Niger Delta community of Odi to quell mutating insurgency. Under code name Operation  Hakuri,  the military was deployed  again to  the Niger Delta communities  of  Ogbogbene,   Smoothgbene,   Tenigbene,  Sandfield,   Mila  Waterside  and Makiva   waterside   to   suppress   mutating   insurgency   in   the    area.27     However,   the counterinsurgency  operation of the Nigerian military as a  solution appeared  to have been counterproductive.  Rather than insurgency atrophying,  it appeared to have attained a more

24The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other than War Volume 1, Strategic and Operational Framework

(Abuja: 2011), 22.

25I. T. Sampson “Niger Delta Militancy: Causes, Origins and Dimensions,” African Security Review Institute for

Security Studies18 no. 2 (2008): 31.

26Cyril I. Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict,”

African Development XXXIV, no. II (2009): 105.

27Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, c. 1999-

2009” (Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, 2015), 6.

organised   and  sustainable   outlook  in  response  to  sustained   conditions  of   oil-related community tensions, environmental degradation, relative poverty and perceived deprivation. The post-1999 insurgency manifested itself in the damage of oil facilities and infrastructures, killing of security and oil personnel, oil theft (bunkering), kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom.

Arguably, post-1999 insurgency in the Niger Delta became prevalent and significant in three states: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. These three states under the period of study were the cash cow of the Nigerian economy as they produced  the largest  quantity of crude oil. Although the response of the Nigerian military to the insurgency appeared to have remained unofficial (i.e without a formal name), in 2003, it was made formal with establishment of the Joint  Task  Force  Operation  Restore  Hope  (JTF  ORH). The  Joint  Task  Force  Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH) was formed and  deployed to the Niger Delta with their area of responsibility covering Delta (Sector I), Bayelsa (Sector II), and Rivers states (Sector III) in

response to insurgency that became prevalent in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers.28

Figure 1.4: Map Showing the Operational Environment of the Joint Task Force 1999-2009

28V. Ojakorotu and L. D. Gilbert, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria

(Johannesburg,2010), 6.

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

The Nigerian Military (Army, Navy and Air Force) under a designated  Joint  Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH) were tasked with the responsibility of countering insurgency  in  the  Niger  Delta  states  of  Delta,  Bayelsa  and  Rivers.  On  the  other  hand, insurgents  operating  within  and  across  Delta,  Bayelsa,  and  Rivers  states  from  camps camouflaged by maze of creeks were able to use their local knowledge of the terrain, riverine access  to  weapons,  finances  through  oil bunkering,  and  connection  to  top  political  and military officials to establish a formidable resistance.

Prior to the commencement  of the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope  (JTF ORH)  in  2003,  military  operations  in  the  Niger  Delta  were  carried  out  by  individual battalions of the Nigerian army. These included 73 battalion, Elele Barrack,  Rivers State, with area of operations  in Rivers and BayelsaStates;  7 battalion,  Effurun  Barracks,  Delta State, with responsibility in Delta State; 2 battalion, Bori Camp, Rivers State, with area of responsibility  in Rivers  State;  195  battalion,  Aganabode,  Benin,  Edo  State  with  area  of responsibility  in Edo and Ondo  States;  65 battalion,  Bonny  Camp,  Lagos;  146 battalion,

Burutu Barracks, Cross River State, with area of operation in Cross River State. In 2007, 93 battalion from Rokuba Barracks, Jos replaced 7 battalion in Effurun.29

The  counterinsurgency  (COIN)  task  and  operation  of  the  JTF  ORH  demanded sustained military operations in a difficult and challenging terrain made up predominantly of creeks,  swamps  and  contiguous  local  communities.  JTF ORH was  demanded  to operate within the professional requirements of Rules of Engagement (ROE), Standing Orders (SOs),

and  economy  in  the  use  of  force.30   The  nature  and  composition  of  their  training  and

orientation was to reflect this professional demand. However, the professional operation of the  military under  the  umbrella  of the  JTF  was constrained  by a  difficult  and  complex operational terrain, (physical and human) communication difficulties, challenges of winning the hearts and minds of the local population, political bottlenecks, human right abuses, and most  significantly  corruption.31   These  constraints  elongated  the  COIN  operations  of  the Nigerian  military  in  the  Niger  Delta,  while  at  the  same  time  gave  the  insurgents  a considerable boost.

Statement of the Problem

The   Nigerian    military   faced    at    least    two    obvious    constraints    in    their counterinsurgency  duty in the Niger  Delta  between  1999  and 2009  which  has  not  been captured in the military historiography of the Niger Delta. These were the military bandwidth and organisational constraints. With an almost complete conventional battlefield orientation, the Nigerian military appeared to have lacked forces specially trained for, and an organisation adapted to, coastal COIN duties in the Niger Delta.  However peculiar and important these constraints were, they have been relatively ignored, consequently begging for a systematic

29Lt. Colonel Otu Abam, oral interview c. 40 years, Commander, 82 Battalion Effurun, Warri, Delta State, June

11, 2013.

30Lt. Colonel Danjuma Y. Danja, oral interview 46 years, JTF Headquarters Opulo, Yenegoa, Bayelsa State, December 22, 2013.

31Lt. Colonel Danjuma Y. Danja, oral interview…

investigation,  analysis and documentation  in the form of a dissertation.  The present  study intends to go beyond the mainstream approaches to COIN constraints in the Niger Delta and examine the peculiarity of military bandwidth and military organisation as a problem faced by the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009.

Theoretical Framework

It has become imperative to situate historical research on relevant social theories to understand the phenomenon and dynamics of the events. Being that the primary purpose of any theory is to  clarify concepts  and  ideas that  have become,  as it were,  confused  and entangled,32  theoretical framework provides a particular perspective, or lens, through which a topic is examined. The study relies on the Military Bandwidth Theory and the Organisational Theory to aid our explanation on the constraints faced by the Nigerian military in its COIN role in the Niger Delta under the period of study.

The bandwidth theory argues that a basic military problem arises when a  military force is so focused on one particular type of opponent that it can be defeated by a different kind of opponent.33When a conventional military is suddenly given  non-conventional task,

there is a tendency that it might run into the problem of insufficient band-width. Metz and

Kievit used this theory to explain the contemporary challenges that the United States is facing in 21st  century wars.34As reflected in Max Boot’s Invisible Armies, the military bandwidth theory is an enduring one, rooted in the history of armed conflict as it significantly explains the challenges faced by big militaries in Guerrilla warfare from ancient times to present.35

32Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1976), 132.

33Qiao Liag and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Thoughts on War and Strategy in a Global Era(Beijing: PLA Arts Publishers, 1999), 153-155.

34Steven Metz and Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy” US Army

Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995.

35Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present(New

York: Liveright Publishing, 2013).

During most of the Middle Ages, for example, the only threat to a  well-armoured, well-mounted  and well-trained  knight was another knight. By the  15thC, knights at Agin- court  and  other  battles  experienced  a  band-width  problem  as  they  were  devastated  by

formerly insignificant  types of opponents such as archers,  halberdiers,  pikemen and  later, arquebusiers.36During   the   Napoleonic   wars   (1803-1815),   the   French   army   became predominantly  used  to  a  conventional  mode  of  warfare  with  its  European  counterpart.

However, they faced a band-width problem when they encountered the Spanish forces which employed guerrilla (small wars) tactics. The inability of the French army to adjust to the new band-width of the Spanish forces saw the eventual defeat of the Napoleon’s military in 1815. The  conventional  nature  of  World  War  I and  II  between  1914  and  1945  restricted  the militaries of mostEuropean nations to a conventional bandwidth. By the time most European nations faced non-conventional armies in colonial wars in Africa and Asia after World War II, they witnessed a bandwidth problem, which at most times,resulted in their defeat.

America’s loss in the Vietnam War has been attributed to a bandwidth problem where a  conventional  fighting  mentality  was  brought  into  a  non-conventional  environment.37

Thomas X. Hammes’  The Sling and the Stone38  and Arreguin-Toft’s  How the Weak  Win

Wars,39have  used the bandwidth theory to explain America’s  inability to achieve a  quick victory in the Second Gulf War (since 2003) as compared to the lightening victory achieved during  the  First  Gulf  War.  In  the  First  Gulf  War,  the  entire  spectrum  of  fighting  was conventional; however, in the Second Gulf War, the spectrum was highly unconventional.40

Between 1979 and 1989, Soviet Union lost in the war against Afghanistan;41  and since 2001,

36Qiao Liag and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Thoughts on War and Strategy in a Global Era,

(Beijing: PLA Arts Publishers, 1999), 153-155.

37Bernd Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (London: Bodley Head, 2009).

38Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004).

39Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005).

40Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “Why Victory Became Defeat in Iraq” Nieman Watchdog, March 30, 2007.

41Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: Harper & Row, 2009).

the United States of America has suffered huge losses in its war against Afghanistan. Military bandwidth theorists blame the loss by these super powers on their conventional patterns of warfare in previous years.42

The  present  study  seeks  to  employ  the  bandwidth  theory  in  a  domestic  setting,

however with a twist. The theory supports the position that the Nigerian military having been used  to a conventional  military settings experienced  a bandwidth  problem  in  the coastal insurgency in the Niger Delta. Although the Nigerian military have been involved in a near- unconventional warfare setting, like the rebel wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, adapting to an insurgency in a complex coastal terrain like the Niger Delta was at most difficult.

One of the reasons that explain why most militaries face the bandwidth problem is the nature and structure of its organisation – the organisational theory. An organization  is the rational coordination of the activities of a number of people for the  achievement of some common  explicit  purpose or goal,  through  division of labour  or  function,  and through  a

hierarchy  of  authority  and  responsibility.43   The  military  is  an  organisation  modelled  to

achieve national objectives through the use of force. As an organisation,  it is made up  of service units (basically the Army, Navy and Air Force) assigned distinct and specialised tasks for overall success. The organizational theory of military operations argues that the way a unit is organised drives how it will fight and the challenges it is bound to face. The ability to confront challenges in an unpredictable non-conventional battle space is arguably a function of capabilities and training.

To  this  end,  the  theory  argues  in  part  that  a  military  organization  trained  and conditioned  to conduct conventional warfare will tend to be tailored towards that  specific task.  Consequently,  deploying  conventional  troops in COIN  operations  would  amount  to

bringing in an elephant into a room. An organisation that is structured and trained for high

42Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How a Superpower Can End Up Losing to the Little Guys” Nieman Watchdog, March

23, 2007.

43Edgar H. Schein, OrganizationalPsychology, (2nd ed.,) (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970) 9.

intensity combat operations  in a conventional  setting  will  lean toward  executing  combat operations  in such  settings,  even  when  the  situation  calls  for  a different  approach.  The organization  of  the  Nigerian  military  units  for  high  intensity  combat  and  their  lack  of preparation for counterinsurgency operation is a simple explanation for the constraints they faced.

The organisational theory of military operations gained verve with Thomas  Rick’s Fiasco and Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations.” Thomas Rick describes  how in the initial  stages of the Iraqi insurgency  US forces  tried carrying  out police  roles such  as cordon,  search  and arrest,  encountered  operational  and strategic setbacks because they created widespread resentment that generated recruits for the

insurgency.44  Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s critique of the US Army’s performance in post invasion

Iraq pointed out the over-reliance on aggressive kinetic operations designed to kill or capture insurgents  and  cultural  insensitivity  that  although  “inadvertent  arguably  amounted   to institutional racism.”45  In all, they argue that the challenges the US Army faced in executing

counterinsurgency operations were, at least in part, due to the reliance on conventional units

to conduct a highly specialised form of warfare.

The organisational theory holds that the demands of counterinsurgency require  full time preparation which can best be achieved in units within a part of the military organisation dedicated to counterinsurgency. Consequently, no unit in the military organisation is capable of performing  every mission  –  conventional  and  unconventional alike.  The  mentality  of conventional assault troops prepared to storm defensive positions may not be consistent with the patience required for  counterinsurgency.  Moreover,  leadership  skills required for high

44Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: Penguin Press, 2006) 192-202, 235-243.

45Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations” Military Review(November- December 2005) 2-15; See also Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq(Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2006) 99-102; Steven Metz, “Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy” Strategic Studies Institute January 2007, 12-41; Bing West, “American Military Performance in Iraq” Military Review, September-October 2006, 2-7; http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army. mil

intensity combat cannot be developed to the highest level while simultaneously struggling to achieve mastery of the diplomatic skills required for counterinsurgency. The theory places a strict  difference  between  organisation  for  conventional  warfare  and  that  of  COIN.  An effective  counterinsurgency  unit requires the capability to:  conduct  combat operations  to defeat insurgent forces; provide security to the population; win the support of the population; identify and develop  local leaders;  and build  civil  institutions.  The organisational  theory holds  that  a  review  of  these  counterinsurgency  capabilities  captures  the  challenges  that conventional units are bound to face in counterinsurgency operations.

Much more difficult and tasking is the ability to carry out security and policing duties by conventional oriented troops. In most cases, the organisational structure of conventional troops is not tailored to adopt a mentality suited to carry out security operations necessary for COIN operations. As argued by Andrew Pavord, the operational focus of security operations

is contrary to the “can do” tempo of a combat battalion.46   While success in  conventional

combat is measured by what happens to the enemy – the defeat of enemy forces, success in security operations is measured by what does not happen. Counterinsurgent  units  must be prepared for the patient work of security operations.

Employing the organisational theory to the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, it can be safely argued that the Nigerian military, through its ad hoc deployment of troops in the Niger  Delta,  appeared  to have been conditioned  to fight  an  unconventional  warfare  in a peculiar terrain against its configuration to engage in  convention warfare. This created the temptation and vulnerability of performing conventional roles in COIN situations. In such a situation,  the  Nigerian  military  faced  significant  transition  costs  as  they  had  to  change mission focus in the Niger Delta  from conventional  to non-conventional  on short notice.

Consequently,   the   terrain,   casualty   management,   logistic   challenges,   communication

46Andrew Pavord, “Force Structure for Small Wars” 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ mag/docs-temp/60- pavord.pdf (accessed November 2, 2014).

difficulty, and other variables became factored in giving the sudden turn to COIN warfare a habit. Consequently, the constraint behind the constrains of the Nigerian military lay in the way the military was assembled and deployed under the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH) between 1999 and 2009.

Purpose and Significance of Study

The study seeks to examine the constraints of the Nigerian military while carrying out counterinsurgency  in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009. This aspect of study in the military history of Nigeria as well as the historiography  of the Niger Delta  appears  less attended  to. Despite the enormous challenges  faced by the Nigerian  military in the Niger Delta insurgency, only newspaper documentation and journalistic commentaries make up for our overall understanding. The study seeks to go beyond the journalistic bias of newspaper reporting and document  the challenges  faced by the  Nigerian military in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009. An examination of the constraints of the Nigerian military would explain why the counterinsurgency efforts assumed such an extensive duration.

Consequently,  the  study  is  significant  for  several  reasons.  It  would  mirror  the adaptation   of  the  Nigerian   military  to  COIN   operations.   Given   that  the   nature   of contemporary warfare  is highly asymmetric  and insurgency-based,  the study  would make useful contributions to the calibration of the Nigerian military for similar operations within or outside  Nigeria.  The  study of changes  and  adaptation  of the  Nigerian  military to  COIN operations in the Niger Delta, which the present study  examines,  would serve as lessons learnt for the military institution in particular and Nigeria in general. It will also mirror the

Nigerian military in terms of readiness and adaptability to 21st  century security challenges.

Since the study derives much of its evidences from personal stories of combat participants in the Nigerian military that were deployed to the Niger Delta, it provides a collective memory of experiences and thus serves as an institutional memory for the military organisation. The

study would  thus be of benefit  to  policy makers,  the Nigerian  military  and  men  in  the profession of arms as well as students in political and military history.

Scope of Study

There are three distinct scope of study in this work: the chronological, geographical and thematic. The chronological scope will stretch from 1999 and 2009. The base chronology marks the period that the Nigerian military were deployed  in a  significant  number to Odi community in Bayelsa  state to restore order. The terminal  chronology marks the military victory at Camp 5 and the subsequent acquiescence  by a significant  number of insurgent groups to embrace the Amnesty deal of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The geographical scope will be restricted to Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states which were the initial Area of Responsibility of the Nigerian military that operated in  the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009. When the Nigerian military were constituted under the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH), Delta state became designated “Sector I,” Bayelsa State was designated “Sector II,” and Rivers state was designated “Sector III.” To this end, the geographical scope of this study would be limited to Sectors I, II and III in the entire Niger Delta.

The thematic  scope  of this  study will be restricted  to  the themes  of  Insurgency- Counterinsurgency (I-COIN). Discussion on the socio-political and demographic constituents of the Niger Delta would be carried out to aid our  understanding  and explanation  of the changes over time witnessed in I-COIN in the Niger Delta under the period of study. While various social actors were responsible for fomenting insurgency (FOIN) in the Niger Delta, it was the reserve responsibility of the  Nigerian military to counterinsurgency (COIN) in the Niger Delta.

Literature Review

Literature review is basically historiography organised around and related directly to a specific  subject  matter.  It  makes  justification  for  the  present  study  by  examining  what knowledge  and  ideas  have  been  established  around  the  subject  matter.  It  portrays  the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies with the aim of identifying gaps in which the present study intends to narrow. The Niger Delta is a sensitive, and to some, an emotional aspect of Nigeria’s history. Consequently, it appears magnetic, attracting an overwhelming amount of literature from pundits,  amateurs, journalists,  and freelance commentators.  The review  of literature  for  the  present  study would  however  concentrate  on literature  from pundits  in  the  field   that   pass  the  methodological   test  of  reliability,   credibility  and objectivity.Reviewed literature that meet these criteria will be selected to cover two broad perspectives – cause and effect – in the analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta with the motive to mirror the challenges of the  Nigerian military. The causal literature review will concern studies on insurgency that aid our explanation of the onset and duration of insurgency in the Niger Delta. Literature bordering on the effect will constitute studies   on   counterinsurgency   that   aid   our   understanding   and   explanation   of   the counterinsurgency role of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta.

The study will first examine classic literature on insurgency. This would assist our understanding of the nature of the Niger Delta insurgency. This is important for our analysis of the challenges faced by the Nigerian military in its COIN role in the Niger Delta, since COIN  is  a  response  to  an  insurgency.  Another  set  of  literature  would  concern  classic literature  on  the  Niger  Delta  which  provides  the  foregrounding  for  understanding  the contemporary profile of the Niger Delta and it proclivity towards insurgency. The next set would  be a review  of general  literature  on  counterinsurgency.  This  will be followed  by available literature on the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations within the Niger Delta.

Gleaned  from  available  literature,  studies  on  insurgency  weave  seamlessly  with studies on counterinsurgency. There seems to be no separate set of literature for insurgency and a separate one for counterinsurgency. Their views are often tailored as classical and non- classical. The classical view derives primarily from the seminal works of David Galula and Robert Thompson. Galula provides a classical definition of  insurgency, and posits that the term refers to a protracted  struggle conducted  methodologically  in order to attain specific

objectives,  in particular  “to overthrow  the existing order”47  Consequently,  Galula lays  the

ideational  foundations  of  COIN  theory based  upon  the  primacy  of  political  power  over military power. According to him, “a revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political.”48  Galula argues for civilian-centric operations and not kinetic warfighting as heavy, indiscriminate weaponry alienates the population and is not conducive of hearts- and-minds  (HAM).  Robert  Thompson’s  ideas  appear  to  be  focused  at the  strategic  and operational  level. Robert Thompson  outlined  five broad  principles:  A clear political  aim, work within the law, the development  of an overall  plan, defeat political subversion  and

secure base areas.49It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the principles outlined by

Thompson are sine qua non to successful COIN operations.50

The classicists’ thesis has been challenged by the Neo-COIN school of thought. The principle tenants of which are Frank Hoffman,51  David Kilcullen52  and David H. Ucko.53   In many respects Neo-COIN represents the restatement of the established maxims of counter- insurgency  as  they  still  emphasise  political  primacy,  but  with  some  significant  twists.

47David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger, 1964), 2.

48David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare …, 63.

49Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966).

50Joshua Gray, “The Challenges of British Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Why did it go so Wrong?” E-

International Relations, November 17, 2014.

51Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters, 37(2), 2007, 1-17.

52David  Kilcullen,  “Counter-Insurgency Redux,”  Survival,  48(4),  2006,  111-130;  David  Kilcullen,  “The

Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal, August 29, 2007.

53David  H.  Ucko,  The  New  Counterinsurgency  Era:  Transforming  the  U.S.  Military  for  Modern  Wars

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

Hoffman,for  instance,  emphasises  the  changing  organisational  structure  of  insurgencies, which are less hierarchal. He however indulges in a twist arguing that  insurgents are more virtual  comprising  loosely  affiliated   networks,   linked  by  a   key  individual/ideology.54

Hoffman  draws  attention  to  new  technologies  in communication,  such  as  internet,  mass

media, which are becoming more central in generating support and recruiting globally.55As part of the twist, Hoffman contends that the contexts in which insurgencies take place are also changing. For example, while the classical approach contends that insurgents seek sanctuary in distant and complex terrain,56  Hoffman argues, however, that “urban centres are […] the insurgents jungle of the twenty-first-century.”57  David Ucko however contends that a whole relearning process is required as the “new counterinsurgency era” of the 21st  century comes with significant challenges for policy maker and practitioners in the profession of arms.58

David  Kilcullen  concurs  with  Hoffman  and  avers  that  much  of  what  comprises contemporary  insurgencies  is  new,  requiring  fundamental  reappraisals  of  conventional wisdom. Kilcullen argues that the capacity of the insurgent is changing due to “globalisation

effects.”59  For example, he draws attention to the complicated international networks which

now aid insurgencies and the increasing use of media for conveying the insurgents’ message to a global audience.  The internet  gives insurgents  near-instantaneous  means  to publicise their cause, it also enables moral and financial support, and a means for recruitment providing the insurgency with a “virtual sanctuary.”60

As  important  as  these  classic  works  on  I-COIN  are,  they  seldom  situate  their discourses  on  the  Niger  Delta  of  Nigeria.  They  only  provide  the  fatal  attraction  to conceptualise  operations of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta  within the theory and

54Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 4.

55Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 8.

56David Galula,Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006), 23.

57Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 5.

58David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era…,

59David Galula,Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958…, 112.

60David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux…,” 113.

practice of COIN. This informs the need to examine literature on the Niger Delta that defines the geography and demography of the Niger Delta which has made it susceptible to violent activities of social movements over the years. Some of these  literature include:Kenneth O.

Dike’s Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta,61G. I. Jones’ The Trading States of the  Oil

Rivers,62   Obaro  Ikime’s  Niger  Delta  Rivalry:  Itseki-Urhobo  Relations  and the  European Presence, 1884-1936,63  and E. J. Alagoa’sA History of the Niger Delta.64While Kenneth Dike examines external influences on the political economyof the Niger Delta in the 19th century; G. I. Jones deals with the local political development of the Niger Delta as an aspect of their total history; E. J. Alagoa examines the history and culture of the Niger Delta, albeit from an Ijo filter; and Obaro Ikime focuses on the dynamics of intergroup relations in the Niger Delta using  the  Itsekiri-Urhobo  relations.  These  classic studiesrepresent  the  first  generation  of literature that set the background for the colouration of the political economy and intergroup relations  of  the  contemporary  Niger  Delta.  An  understanding  of  these  first  generation

literature on the Niger Delta significantly explains the historical forces that have made  the contemporary Niger Delta susceptible to conflicts and crises. Although the term “insurgency” is hardly used by these first generation  historians of the Niger Delta,  their works set the background for appreciating the contemporary profile of the Niger Delta.

Obaro Ikime’s The Fall of Nigeria,65  Tekana Tamuno’sThe Evolution of the Nigerian

State,66   and  Joseph  U.  Asiegbu’sNigeria  and  its British  Invaders,67represent  the  second generation  or  revisionist  scholars  of  the  Niger  Delta.  They  reflect  the  phenomenon  of

61Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta…, 30-45.

62G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria

(London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

63Obaro Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the European Presence 1884-1936 (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd 1969), 65-70.

64E. J. Alagoa, A History of the Niger Delta: An Historical Interpretation of Ijo Oral Tradition (Ibadan: Ibadan

University Press, 1972), 23-44.

65Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977).

66Tekana N. Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914 (London: Longman

Group Ltd., 1978) 23-48.

67Joseph U. Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders, 1851-1920: A Thematic Documentary History (Enugu: Nok Publishers, 1984).

insurgency in their works but rarely use the word wholesale. Obaro Ikime preferred to use the word “revolt” for the Akassa insurgency of 1895, Tekena Tamuno preferred to use the word “disturbances” for the Ekumeku insurgency between 1898 and 1911. Without being apt in the use  of  the  word  “insurgency”and“counterinsurgency,”Obaro  Ikime,  Tekena  Tamuno  and Johnson U. Asiegbu provide historical evidences to show that  insurgency is rooted in the history of the Niger Delta. They all agree to the testament that the desire for Britain to dictate the  lucrative  palm  oil  trade  resulted  in  varying  degrees  of  insurgency  from  the  local communities in the Niger Delta.

Consequently, British armed reaction to quell such mutating threats to their imperial gains passed for counterinsurgency.  Johnson Asiegbu sites the Brohemie War of 1894, The Akassa War of 1895, the Benin and Aro Expedition of 1897 and 1901,  as well as other military expeditions  in the Nsit and other Ibibio districts as  variations of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the present day Niger Delta. Consequently, and building upon these first generation literature, S. Aghalino, “British Colonial Policies and the Oil Palm Industry in the

Niger  Delta  Region  of Nigeria,  1900-1960”68   identifies  colonialism  as the root cause  of

insurgency  in  the  Niger  Delta.  Although  the  works  of  these  authors  provide  important background  facts,  the  present  study  intends  to  go  beyond  their  perceived  chronological constraints.

Ebi B. Asain’s, In the Creeks of Fire: Inspired by the Fight for Justice and Freedom in the Niger Delta, Tekena N. Tamuno’sOil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009,69  Otoabasi Akpan’s Niger Delta Question and the Peace Planand Cyril Obi’s Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Deltaappear to represent the third wave of serious and  deliberate scholarship on the Niger  Delta  from  a  neo-revisionist  filter.  They  all  examine  the  contemporary  issue  of

insurgency in the Niger Delta and the extent to which it has attracted the counterinsurgency

68S. O. Aghalino, “British Colonial Policies and the Oil Palm Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,

1900-1960” African Study Monographs 21, no. 1, (2000): 25-29.

69Tekana N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009, Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011.

response by the Federal government. Ebi Asain resonates how the variables of justice  and freedom in a resource control conditioned environment drove young and productive men into the creeks to challenge the Nigerian state. Ebi Asain is of the view that the deployment of sections of the Nigerian military to smoke out “militants” from the creek has met with stiff resistance given the resolve of youths in the Niger Delta who have suffered years of neglect, injustice and marginalisation.Akpan  examines the military approach towards the search for peace  in  the  Niger  Delta  and  concludes  that  the   military  in  spite  of  possession  of sophisticated and mammoth instruments of conflict resolution is ill-equipped as arbiters of domesticconflicts. Hesees the use of the idea behind the deployment of the Nigerian military

in the Niger Delta as the Mad Man’s Theory.70

Tekena Tamuno is one of the few scholars who lay emphasis on the period 1999 –

2009, the chronological width of the present study. He uses the phrase “oil wars” for  the enduring  insurgency  in the Niger Delta since 1849. According to Tamuno,  the  Oil  Wars began as a Palm Oil-driven set of encounters since 1849 before it reached  its status of a Crude Oil-driven war after Oloibiri’s wells were exploited in 1958. Emphasising the weapon of choice, Tamuno avers that from the era of Consular jurisdiction in the Bights of Biafra and Benin, the choice weapon consisted of gun-boats; but by May 2009 encounter in Gbaramatu

kingdom, helicopter gun-ships were preferred.71Tamuno describes the oil wars between 1999

and 2009 as the “long trek towards amnesty”72and  argues that the use of the military  to suppress every expression of protest succeeded in alienating the population and driving it into more stubborn opposition.

Cyril Obi stands out as one of the few scholars that have used the term “insurgency”

for the Niger delta in its wholesomeness and aptness. Heargues that petro-violence has for strategic,  economic  and  political  reasons  brought  the  Niger  Delta  to  the  forefront  of

70Otoabasi Akpan’s Niger Delta Question..,

71Tekana N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009, Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011.

72Ibid.

international  energy  and  security  concerns.  In  Obi’s  view,  the  insurgency  is  linked  to Nigeria’s  history,  internal  contradictions  and  politics,  as  well  as  to  the  nature  of  the integration of the Niger Delta into the international political economy of oil in ways that have simultaneously enriched international oil companies and their partners –  national and local elites  –  and  contributed  to  the  disempowerment  and  impoverishment  of  local  peoples, through direct dispossession, repression and the pollution of the air, lands and waters of the region. The turn to violent resistance in Obi’s view took place in the context of prolonged military  rule,  marginalization   and   repression  of  community  protests.  It  has  involved government armed forces (the Nigerian military) engaging in pacifying protesting or feuding communities,  or  fighting  local  militias  resisting  exploitation  and  marginalization  by the Nigerian state and its  partners, the oil multinationals  (MNCs). While these neo-revisionist literature examine extensively contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, they seldom pay attention to the challenges  faced by the Nigerian military in their COIN role in the Niger Delta. This is the gap in previous studies that the present study seeks to remedy.

Other studies on the Niger Delta are less historical having a rather restrictive focus. Their focus is predominantly on the cause of insurgency in the Niger Delta in the post-1999 period. S. I. Omofonmwan and L. O. Odia, “Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta

Region of Nigeria”73argue  that the causes of insurgency  in the Niger-Delta  region is  the

inability of the multinational companies involved in the production of crude oil to mitigate the  negative  consequences   of  their  activities.  A.  Odoemene“Social   Consequences   of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria”74examines  the  causes of insurgency through the filter of the environmental degradation of the Niger  Delta; while O. F. Idowu

73S. I. Omofonmwan and L. O. Odia, “Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria,”

Journal of Human Ecology, 26, no. 1 (2009): 28.

74A. Odoemene, “Social Consequences of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria”, Journal of

Sustainable Development 4, no. 2, (2011): 129.

“Niger Delta Crises: Implication for Society and Organizational Effectiveness”  blames  the Nigerian economy,Aderoju  Oyefusi,  “Oil-dependence  and Civil Conflict  in  Nigeria,” sees lack of national  integration,  inter-group  antagonism,  lack of economic  development,  and socio-economic disparities as the underlying factors of insurgency.75

Oyefusi links the Niger Delta crisis to weak institutional arrangements, deficiency in

enforcement,  an  ineffective  security  system,  a  mix  of  interest  between  states  and  oil companies  resulting  in  oppressive  measures  on  communities  by  states  during  dispute situations,  looting,  and  rent  seeking  competition  within  local  members,  amongst  others, without addressing the deeper roots of these factors.76In another study, Oyefusi emphasises individual level factors that include low income, low literacy, lack of assets and absence of marital engagement as factors that increase the tendency of people to take up arms, and that most of these  factors  can be addressed  through  a  combination  of economic  policies  and

effective counterinsurgency presence in the Niger Delta.77

Onasoga complements Oyefusi and identifies lack of social amenities, operation of oil companies below the acceptable international standard of environmental safety (including gas flaring), political dominance, marginalization or economic deprivation, and the inadequacies of the country’s  police  force to secure life and properties  of the  citizens  as contributing

factors to insurgency.78  In an attempt to interrogate the peculiarity of insurgency in the Niger

Delta  situation,  Cyril  Obi,  “Oil  Extraction,  Dispossession,  Resistance  and  Conflict   in

75A. F. K. Aprezi, “Threats to Internal Security in the Niger Delta: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces” (National War College Nigeria, Research Paper June 2000), 24; N. Kasfir, “The Shrinking Political Arena” quoted in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980, Volume One Causes and Dimensions of ConflictA. M. Yakubu (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005); T. A.  Imobighe, “Introduction: Civil Society, Ethnic Nationalism and Nation Building in Nigeria” Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria, ed. T. A. Imobighe, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2003); R. T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1996).

76R. T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance…, 5–12.

77Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil and the Propensity to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” Post-

Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 8, World Bank Policy Working Paper 4194, (April 2007), 1–4.

78A. K. Onasoga “Effects of Ethnic Militia on National Security,” (Armed Forces Command and Staff College

Nigeria, College Paper SC 28, 2006), 75–76.

Nigeria’s Oil Rich Niger Delta” contends that insurgency in the Niger Delta rides on  the groundswell  of popular  anger  linked  to  the alienation,  dispossession,  and  neglect  of the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, by the government and transnational institutions. In Obi’s view, Niger Delta insurgency portrays an organized resistance by local forces to contest,  repossess,  and  control  their  natural resources  particularly  oil  and  gas.  Insurgent groups  blocked  further  alienation,  expropriation,  and   environmental  degradation  by  a transnational  oil alliance  comprising  the  oil  multinationals,  their  home  governments,  the

Nigerian state, and ruling elite coalitions.79

In as much as the knowledge of the causal dynamics of insurgency in the Niger Delta is important for the present study, an examination of the role of the military and their peculiar challenges  in the Niger Delta appears neglected.  The present study  seeks  to remedy this neglect.

The military has always been an important institution in every socio-political  system.  The involvement of the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations in the Niger Delta has its roots in the use of the military to manage domestic crisis in Nigeria. Arguably, Military involvement in internal security operations (ISOPs) is inevitable as the need for higher level of aggression continually reveal itself.

As argued by Victor A. Elaigwu, the literature on the Nigerian military in domestic conflict  spots has grown tremendously.  In his book,The Military and the  Management  of Civil  Crises  in  Nigeria,  1960-1993,  Victor Elaigwuexplains  that  the  military  has  been  a veritable  factor  in  crisis  management   in  Nigeria  since   independence.   As  regards  an assessment of their effectiveness,  he argues that the deployment of a military force in Tiv division in 1960 could not deter the eruption of violence in the area in 1961, nor could a

similar exercise of military force in February 1964 dissuade the people from further acts of

79Cyril I. Obi, “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil Rich Niger Delta”

Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30, no. 1-2 (2010): 219-236.

violence  between  July and  August  1964,  culminating  in another  military  deployment  in November 1964. He argues further that in 1980, the full force of military might was deployed in Kano against Maitatsine, but neither this nor subsequent exercise of physical force could discourage  similar occurrences  in Bullumkuttu,  Rigasa,  Jimeta–Yola  and Gombe in 1982,

1984 and 1985 respectively. He concludes that while the exercise of brute force is capable of cowing  insurgents  in  particular  situations,  its  inherent  inability  to  resolve  basic  socio- economic  contradictions  of  which  the  unrest  are  tangible  manifestations,  renders  such

problems an inescapable and recurrent  phenomenon.80  In as much as this work gives a detail

of the Nigerian military operations, their strength and weaknesses  in the Middle Belt  and some northern states of Nigeria,  this work concentrates  on the first thirty three  years of Nigeria’s independence, and as such there is need to study insurgencies and counterinsurgent operations in the recent past and the Niger Delta in particular.

R. O. Dode “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict in the Niger Delta: Challenges of Human Security and Development” opines that Nigeria’s security forces have performed well in a number of peace keeping operations in Africa and a number of other continents. He states that their performance during internal conflicts in different parts

of the country and especially the Niger Delta is below average.81E. A. San’s “Military in

Internal Security Operations:  Challenges and Prospects82alsodiscusses  the functions of  the military, and dealt on some instances of military involvement in internal security operations. He traces some of the challenges  of the military in internal operations in  Nigeria. These literatures will serve as a guide for the present study as this research intends to concentrate on

80 V. A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria…., 198-285.

81R. O. Dode “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict in the Niger Delta: Challenges of Human Security and Development”European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1, no.3 (2012): 412.

82E. A. San, “Military in Internal Security Operations: Challenges and Prospects” (A Paper Presented at the

Nigerian Bar Association 53rd Annual General Conference, Tinapa Calabar, 28th   August 2013), 15.

the constraints of the Nigerian Military operations in the region that the Joint Task Force code named “Operation Restore Hope” was deployed.83

International  Crisis  Group  (ICG),study  on  The  Swamps  of  Insurgency:  Nigeria’s Delta Unrest examines the colonial history of the region, the marginalization  of the local ethnic  groups  by the  failures  of the  Nigerian  federal  and  state  governments  to  provide essential basic  services  and the exploitation  of natural  resources  by the Nigerian  federal

government and foreign oil companies.84  They provide a series of recommendations through

this study that essentially “line up” with the principles and strategies of counterinsurgency, minus the military action. Human Rights Watch (HRW), piece on The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence is a study detailing the conditions and causal agents to the violence and instability in present-day  Nigeria.85   Their  report  describes  the  lack  of  governance,  the  dominance  of personal agendas, corruption and organised crime contending for profits from oil exploration, and the prevalence of armed violence for different factions to gain or maintain control of this valuable resource. As HRW characterizes the level of violence in the Delta region as a war,

they  were  unable  to  directly  discuss  the  constraints  of  the  Nigerian  Military  in  their counterinsurgency operations.

International  Crisis Group  (ICG),  document  on Rivers  and Blood:  Guns,  Oil  and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,86  is a study of the cultural aspects of violence,  access to small arms and light weapons, and the tradition of ethnic resistance to centralised and non-

representative  government  in the  eastern  part  of the Niger  River  Delta,  centred  on  Port

Harcourt.  The  study  amplifies  the  Warri  Crisis  published  in  2003,  and  delves  into  the

83R. O. Dode, “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict…, 412.

84International Crisis Group,The Swamps of Insurgency: Niger Delta’s Unrest(Brussels: International Crisis

Group, 2006).

85International Crisis Group, The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence(Brussels: International Crisis Group), 2003.

86International  Crisis  Group,Rivers and  Blood:  Guns,  Oil  and  Power in  Nigeria’s  Rivers State(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005).

emergence of armed groups in the Delta region. The study provides an insight into the social and political causes for conflict.

Chop  Fine’sThe  Human   Rights  Impact  of  Local  Government   Corruption   and Mismanagement  in  Rivers  state,  Nigeria87reports  on  corruption  at  the  local  and  state governmental level in Rivers state of Nigeria illustrates essential elements of the insurgent operational environment  that directly contributes to the likelihood  of a  classic insurgency emerging in the Niger Delta. The report outlines that corruption compromises all categories of public  governance;  economic,  public  health,  education,  infrastructure,  investment  and economic.They further illustrate the environment within which COIN operations will have to

be conducted, and some of the requirements for that future COIN campaign. While this report is important to these study, the need to assess the constraints  of the Nigerian  military in COIN operations is relevant.

The bulk of the existing  literature  on the Niger  Delta  insurgency  is either  about analysis  and  theories  of  marginalization,   structural  underdevelopment,   poverty,  socio- economic inequality, environmental degradation or unemployment as the bane of insurgency in the region. The constraints of the Nigerian Military COIN appears vacant. The reasonswhy the Nigerian Military lingered for so long in its counter-insurgency operations in the Niger Delta have not been given scholarly attention.  It is therefore observed  that none of these literatures  have  systematically  examined  the  Nigerian  Military  constraints  in  tackling militancy  in the  Niger  Delta. This  study which  shall  be  a major  departure  from  earlier attempts  at  reconstructing  the  constraints  of the  Nigerian  military  COIN  operations  and insurgency in the Niger Delta intends to fill the observed gap in literature which has not been given attention by previous studies.

Method, Sources and Organisation

87Chop Fine, The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007).

Historical  methodology  is  the  process  by  which  historians  gather  evidence  and formulate ideas about the past. It is the framework through which an account of the past is constructed.  As it borders on the management  of evidences,  the narrative,  analytical  and

quantitative  approaches  were  used  to  manage  objectively.88   Historical  analysis  provides

sufficient help in understanding the nature and continuities of insurgencies over time vis-a-vis changes in the insurgents’ environment of the Niger Delta. As it borders on the collection of evidence, this study made use of primary and secondary sources which as a matter of fact complement and validate each other. The primary sources used include  written documents obtained from Calabar, Ibadan and Kaduna archives and non-written sources (oral data and material  culture)  obtained  from  the field.  The secondary  sources include  text books  and journal articles on the Niger Delta insurgents and counterinsurgency obtained from libraries. Combat participants from both sides as well as other non-combat participant, varying in age, occupation, religion and status were carefully selected and interviewed.

The  work  is  organised   into  five  chapters  and  is  presented   sequentially   and chronologically.Chapter  one is the introduction  which considers the background  of  study, statement of the problem, theoretical framework, purpose and significance of study, scope of study,    literature    review    and    method,    sources    and    organisation.    Chapter    two examinescounterinsurgency  operations of theNigerian  military before 1999. Chapter three examines the Niger Delta Insurgency and deployment of the Nigerian military. Chapter four examines the Nigerian military counterinsurgency  constraints in the Niger Delta. The last

chapter is summary and conclusion of the work which terminates in 2009.

88Objectivity in history defines the treatment of data. It is attained when the opinion, shades, bias, colouration, and feelings of the historian are not mirrored in his attempt to explain the event using the evidence at his disposal. See M. C. Lemon, The Discipline of History and the History of Thought(New York: Routledge, 1995),

14; See  also Peter  Novick,  That  Noble Dream:  The ‘Objectivity Question’ and  the American Historical Profession(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25; UbongEssienUmoh and ChukwumaOsakwe, “Objectivity in History: OkonUya’s Contribution to the Debate and Art,”Lapai Journal of Central Nigeria History, 7, no. 2, (2013): 2.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS BEFORE 1999

Introduction

Before the post-1999 Niger Delta insurgency, the Nigerian military has been actively involved in counterinsurgency operations within and outside Nigeria. Outside Nigeria, various peacekeeping operations add up to the experience of the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations. Within Nigeria, the various internal security operations made up for internal peacekeeping operations bearing the same texture as counterinsurgency. This chapter seeks to examine the various post-independence counterinsurgency operations in the form of peacekeeping that the Nigerian military were involved in and how it prepared them for recent counterinsurgency experience.

The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations outside Nigeria

The participation of the Nigerian military in external counterinsurgency operations has been in the form of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping89  evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement as conceived in chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Peacekeepers are tasked with increasingly broad mandates, including civilian protection,

counter-terror, and counterinsurgency operations.90 Consequently, counterinsurgency (COIN)

has safe connections with peacekeeping operations given the overall nature of its operations. First peacekeeping, like COIN, seeks to interpose forces in order to develop an enabling

89“Traditional” peacekeeping refers to the deployment of an interposition force with the task to supervise, monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire between former belligerents. See Michael Bothe, “Peacekeeping,” in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: University Press Oxford, 2002).

90Danielle Renwick, Peace Operations in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2015.

environment for peace-making efforts to be established or re-established. Second, peacekeeping operations, like COIN, operate under the principle of the non-use of force, except in self-defence. Third, peacekeeping missions, like COIN, are required to approach the

use-of force in its minimalist fashion.91

Before the deployment of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian military has participated in several peacekeeping operations around the globe since independence in 1960. Nigeria has taken part in continental peacekeeping operations by providing UN peacekeepers to Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, Tanzania (1964), Chad (1979; 1981-1982), Angola (1991), Namibia (1991), Mozambique (1992), Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1993), in global peacekeeping operations in Lebanon (1978-1982), Yugoslavia (1992),  Cambodia (1992-

1993), and sub-regional peacekeeping in Liberia (1990-1998) and Sierra Leone (1998-1999)

among others.92

Nigeria’s Role in Congo Peace Keeping Operations

The Congo Civil War, or Congo Crisis, was a complex political tumult that began just days following Belgium’s granting of Congolese independence in 1960. On June 30, 1960, Belgium negotiated post-colonial mining rights in declaring an independent Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).93 Yet within days, soldiers of the Congolese army mutinied, demanding increased pay and the removal of white officers from their ranks.  When Belgium intervened militarily, more soldiers rebelled.  Many of these soldiers gravitated toward the radical nationalist Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba. The war lastedfor four years, and

the associated violence claimed an estimated 100,000 lives including the nation’s first Prime

Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a plane crash

91D. A. Briggs and J. G. Sanda, Issues of Peace and Security in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Major General

Charles B. Ndiomu(Bukuru: National Institute Press, 2004), 5.

92Adekeye, Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa(London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 90.

93Kevin Shillington,Encyclopedia of African History (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004).

as he attempted to mediate the crisis.94   Escalating with the secession of the southernmost province of Katanga, the conflict concluded with a united Congo emerging under the dictatorship of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Then, dominated by Belgian business interests, the mineral-rich Katanga province under the leadership of Moïse Kapenda Tshombe seceded

from the DRC with Belgian support.95   Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime

Minister Lumumba asked and received a peacekeeping force from the United Nations (UN). On July 14, 1960, the UN Security Council called on Belgium to withdraw her troops from Congo and also authorized the UN Secretary General to provide the government of Congo with necessary military assistance until the country’s security forces could meet their task fully.96 The UN called on Nigeria to help by contributing troops even before her independence.Nigeria attained its independence on October 1, 1960 and joined the United Nations on October 7, 1960.97Nigeria contributed troops to the Congo under the UN Operation Des Nation Unies Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964.98

Nigerian soldiers who served in some of the most difficult areas strived along with other UN forces to execute their assignment which included among others: Helping the Congolese government to restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo, helping the Congolese government maintain law and order in the country and putting into effect a wide and long term programme of training and technical assistance.99  The Nigerian troops were the last to leave the Congo on June 30, 1964 after dedicated efforts in the service of mankind in search of international peace and security. However, The Congo

94Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa(Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1989).

95H. M. Epstein(ed)., Revolt in the Congo, 1960-1964(New York: Facts on File, 1965).

96G. Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operations in the Congo, 1960-1964 (London: Oxford University Press,

1978).

97G. Habu, “Peace Support Operations in Africa,” in G. B. Shederack (ed.),Introduction to Peace and Conflict

Studies in West Africa(Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007).

98EricG.Bernanand and Katie E. Sams,Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva: United

Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 107.

99Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations Revisited,”

Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and management Studies 4, no. 2 (2015): 4.

crisis thus provided the first situation where Nigeria could partner with other professional forces within the United Nations in peacekeeping operations.

Training for the Nigerian contingent that participated in peacekeeping in Congo mainly focused on basic skills, such as patrolling, map reading, observation post duties, mine clearing, communication skills, manning of road blocks, first aidand field hygiene under the

Geneva Conventions.100During the operations, Nigerian troops suffered from ambushes – a

phenomenon peculiar to insurgency. A peculiar ambush on the Nigerian contingent was in between Leopoldvilleand the Katanga Region.While in the Congo, the Nigerian troops were commended for their courage and gallantry.101  The United Nations decorated Major AdekunleFajuyi for setting a good example of courage and gallantry, and for displaying a high degree of leadership, military skills and ability.102The troops brought Nigeria great honour and pride. As a result of their wonderful performance, Ironsi was appointed the commander of the UN force in Congo in 1964. Nigerian contingents were also sent to

Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964 under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity (OAU).103 Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operation at this infant stage of her independence could be attributed to its bid to make her a force to be reckoned with in the

region and internationally.

Nigeria and Chad Operation 1979

Chad, a vast landlocked nation rich in oil and uranium, has faced severe and violent internal turmoil since it gained independence from France in 1960. The country’s post-colonial history has been marked by a long series of coups, and the country has not seen a peaceful

100M. S. Ahmed, Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations (Peace Operations Training Institute,

2013).

101L. Onoja, Peacekeeping and International Security in a Changing World (Jos:Mono Expressions Publishers)

1996),l.

102O. B. C. Nwolise, “Nigeria and International Peacekeeping Operations Since 1960” in Twenty-five Years of

Nigerian Foreign Policyed. G. A. Nweke(Nsukka: NSIA.1986).

103F. A, Agwu, World Peace through World Law:The Dilemma of the United Nations Security

Council(Ibadan:University Press Plc), 2007.

transition of power since independence. Like many of its neighbors across the Sahel belt— which stretches from the arid Maghreb region of North Africa into tropical Central and West Africa—Chad has historically been divided between an Arab-influenced north and a black

“African” south.104 During the French colonial period, Chad’s southern region was the

breadbasket of the region, producing cotton and agricultural goods. Southerners won the favor of the French, and political control of the country at independence. Immediately following independence in 1960, French-appointed President Francois Tombalbaye faced threats from political rivals and quickly established an autocratic government. A Christian from southern Chad, Tombalbaye alienated Muslim northerners, who launched a violent opposition against the government. Tombalbaye retaliated by declaring a state of emergency and then dissolving the National Assembly in response to rioting by the opposition. 105

In 1966, the northern revolt, led by the Chadian National Liberation Front, began a full- fledged war against the Tombalbaye regime.In the early 1970s, French troops intervened to quell the northern revolt, but in 1975, Tombalbaye was deposed in a coup and replaced by another southern Christian, Felix Malloum.Before President Tombalbaye was deposed, the leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, crossed the Libya-Chad border and occupied a swath of uranium-rich land called the Aouzou strip. This incident not only marked the beginning of Libya’s ongoing role in Chad, but also underscored Colonel Gaddafi’s desire for Arab-domination in the Sahel region. Chad’s largely nomadic northern population suffered continued grievances under President Malloum. In 1979, Muslim northerner Goukouni

Oueddei forced President Mallou out of power with support from Libya.

104Adebajo, A., “Nigeria,” in A.J. Bellamy & P.D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford University Press, 2013).

105C. Dokubo, “Nigeria’s International Peacekeeping and Peace Building Efforts in Africa, 1960 – 2005,” in

Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council, ed.,A. A. Bola(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005).

The Chadian peace-keeping operation was the first case of Nigeria being the initiator of the operation and deployed troops and personnel to carry it out.106With the Chadian situation worsening, Nigeria’s feeling of insecurity and desire to see an end to the several years of

crises in Chad made her organize a peace conference for Chad in March 1979 at Kano. The conference brought Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, Niger and Cameroon together with four warring Chadian factions. Following appeals for help from French and Chadian governments and in accordance with the Kano conference decision, Nigeria sent her troops to Chad on 7th March

1979 with Force Commander as Col. Mohammed Magoro.107  Nigerian troops in Chad were

both peacekeepers and peacemakers, the dual role being in accordance with the first Kano Accord in which it was resolved that the peace keeping force would participate in the demilitarization of N’djamena and its environs up to 100 kilometers, participate in the enforcement of ceasefire to ensure free movement of civilians throughout Chad and to provide a forum for the warring groups to negotiate and discuss in daily conference.108

Nigeria’s Role in Lebanon Operations, 1978 – 1983

The Palestine and Israeli question has created tension and caused bloodshed and wanton destruction of property for over three decades.109  The situation became more desperate and complex in early 1978 following a full scale invasion of Southern Lebanon by Israel forces in retaliation, after Palestinian commandos’ raided Israeli territory. In reaction to the Israeli invasion, the central government of Lebanon appealed to the UNO to help it re-establish its

authority in southern Lebanon occupied by Israeli forces who were determined to flush out

106Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations Revisited,”

Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and management Studies 4, no. 2 (2015): 5.

107Hamman, S.  & Omojuwa, K., “The Role of Nigeria in  Peacekeeping Operations from 1960 to 2013,”

Mediterranean Journal of Social Science, 4 no. 16 (2013).

108Ibid.

109Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 5.

Palestinian Liberation Organization members operating against Israel from there.110The UN Security Council met over the request of Lebanon, called on Israel to cease its military action against Lebanon’s territorial integrity immediately, and by resolution 425 established on March 19, 1978 the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to: confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and help the Lebanese

government re-establish its effective authority in the area occupied by Israeli forces.111   The

UN Secretary General called on and got contributed troops from 10 member nations –

Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Fiji, France, Nepal, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway.

The first Nigerian contingent known as NIBATT (Nigerian Battalion) of about 673 officers and men left Nigeria for Lebanon in May, 1978 and began its job of peacekeeping by policing a land area of about 50 square kilometers located around the strategic zone of the Akiya Bridge linking southern Lebanon and the rest of Lebanon. Due to the strategic importance of their area of operation, the Nigerian troops had to carry out foot and mobile patrols, check against the smuggling of arms and ammunitions, man numerous check points, prevent the warring parties from entering UN troops locations, man Observation Posts (OP),

man listening posts, maintain peace in the area of operation and reassure the local inhabitants of their safety.112

The Nigerian contingent throughout the period of peace keeping were replaced every six months, and the last contingent was pulled out of UNIFIL and withdrawn from Lebanon due to the over running of UNIFIL positions by Israel to invade Lebanon. About 5,500 officers and men and about 9 battalions of the Nigerian Armed Forces served in UNIFIL operations from May 1978 to January 1983, during which period 2 officers and 8 men died in the

service.  In fact, Nigeria, lost Captain Oweh, Lance Corporal Mohammed Tanko and

110A. l Abiola et al, “Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operation in Africa: An Analysis of the Costand

Benefits;” Defence Studies,8, 1998.

111Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 5.

112Ibid.

Signalman Enahoro,ammunition and equipment though the mission operated under rules of engagement (ROE) in which the use of arms was highly constrained. Eventually the Nigerian government elected to cut its losses in the ever-worsening security environment and pulled its troops out in 1983. The good performance of Nigerian troops in Lebanon earned them praises

and brought Nigeria international respect.113

During the NIBATT VIII UNO medal presentation parade held at TayrZibna (Lebanon) in

1972, the UNIFIL commander Lt. General William Callaghan told the Nigerian troops that the UN medal being given them was symbolic “not only for their service… but as a recognition by all peace-loving nations of the world for efforts in maintaining peace in the troubled area.”114Callaghan commended the men of NIBATT VIII for playing a fitting role in helping the UNFIL achieve its mission despite the difficulties the men faced from various armed groups in Lebanon. Nigeria’s Brigadier Mrs. Sami who was the contingent commander was appointed the UNFIL Chief of Staff.

Nigeria’s Role inLiberia, 1990-1998

The crisis in Liberia had its genesis from the manner in which the country was established, organized and governed up to the election in 1985.115 Class contradictions, ethnic rivalries, despotism and intolerance of political diversity contributed to the crisis.The conflict of successive or leadership between President Tolbert and the populace that wanted political

reforms snowballed into the “Rice riots” in 1979.116The intervention of Samuel Doe and the

eventual execution of public officers, including the confiscation of property belonging to

Americo-Liberians brought tension. Widespread dissatisfaction ushered in popular revolt in

113Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 6.

114E. L. Adulugba, “The Nigerian Army in Peace Keeping,” in SOJA, 7, no. 7, 1982.

115S. V. L. Malu, ECOMOG: A Peace Keeping Operation in Perspective,” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions,ed.,Amadu Sesay,(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014), 161.

116A. A. Abubakar“Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience” in Peace Support Operations in the New Global Environment: The Nigerian Perspective,eds., Gboribiogha J. Jonah and Istifanus S. Zabadi (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), 2009), 180.

1989 and brought Charles Taylor into the Liberian crisis. Supported by Cote d’Ivoire and

Burkina Faso, Taylor invaded the country and the crisis degenerated into a civil war.117

In December 1989 soldiers of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the command of Charles Ghanky Taylor launched an attack on Liberia from the Cote d’ Ivorian boarder with Liberiai. Within months the fighting had escalated with the NPFL making steady and continuous military progress toward Monrovia. By March 1990, law and order had virtually broken down in most parts of Liberia (Monrovia was clearly threatened) as various rebels groups, which had spring up fought for control of different parts of the

country.The Economic Community of West African States in response to the total breakdown of law and order in the country, the humanitarian catastrophe and the growing threat to sub- regional peace and security met in Banjul, the Gambia and established a Standing Mediation Committee to resolve the crisis.118

As the security situation in Liberia degenerated, both the UN and the USA exhibited

complete apathy to the problem. Nigeria had to take the initiative get other members of the ECOWAS to intervene in the interest of Liberia and those other states within the sub- region.119 This led to the establishment of ECOMOG. Nigeria’s effort in Peacekeeping operations in Liberia can be examined under political/diplomatic and military perspectives. Operation Liberty was the codename given to ECOMOG operations to liberate Liberia from the carnage that was going on in the country at the wake of the invasion by rebel’s forces of Charles Taylor. The political/diplomatic aspects were undertaken by prominent statesmen and envoys.

By August 1990 ECOWAS deployed 3,500 strong West African troops made up of contingents from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia to Liberia. The

117S.K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations (Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2003), 41.

118Amadu Sesay “Background to Civil Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone,” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions, ed., Amadu Sesay,(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014): 43-68.

119M.A.Vogt,The Liberian Crisis and the ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping(Lagos: Gabumo

Publishers Co. Ltd, 1992), 83.

peacekeepers ECOMOG deployment was vehemently opposed by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) who saw ECOMOG as a ploy by some West African counties (particularly Nigeria) to deprive him from taking over Monrovia. NPFL thus launched immediate attack on ECOMOG as the troops landed in Monrovia. In response, ECOMOG was forced to change its operational mandate from peace keeping to peace enforcement within a month of deployment with specific order to create a buffer zone between NPFL forces and Monrovia. Nigeria Battalions Numbers 1 and 2 (NIBATTS 1&2), on December 24 1990, had to clear the rebels at Freeport, where ECOMOG Headquarters

was located and took positions from PO River to Paynville.120

While in Liberia, ECOMOG were involved in various types of missions-peace keeping, peace enforcement, mediation, disarming of rebel groups, and the protection of humanitarian aids.121Following the Abuja I and II peace agreement among the major warlords and other interest groups a cease -fire was declared, and a time-table set for election which were held

on July 19,1997.The elections were overwhelming won by Charles Taylor’s of the National Patriotic Party (NPP) with about 75.3% of the votes cast in the presidential election and21 out of 26 seats in the Senates and 49 out of 60 seats in the House of RepresentativesNigeria contributed immensely to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an interventionist mediation force to end the protracted Liberian civil war, where the government of Nigeria

puts the financial cost at 8 billion dollars (over N800 billion) apart from a large number of lost and maimed soldiers in 1987.122

The Nigerian Naval Task Force and the Nigerian Air Force Task Force, supporting the

ECOMOG Force played important roles by dislodging the factional fighters from their hideouts thereby forcing them to accept the option of a negotiated peace settlement.  In

120S.K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 64.

121Charles Ukeje, “State Disintegration and the Civil War in Liberia,” in Civil Wars, Child Soldiers and Post- Conflict Peace Building in West Africa, Ahmadu Sesay, ed., (Ibadan: College Press Publishers, 2003), 92.

122Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa, “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping

Operations from 1960 to 2013,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, 21, (2014): 43.

addition, during other secondary operations, the various NIBATTS deployed at the frontages were able to beat back the attacks from NPFL rebels. The formation of Nigerian Brigades in

1992 with the task to open up to the hinterland facilitated the withdrawal of NPL rebel forces to the North Eastern fringes of the country.123

The civil war in Liberia is significant for two reasons. First, it served as an important example of a new type of external intervention – intervention by a sub-regional organization. Second,

it has led to a re-examination by African leaders, of the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is one of the principles underlying the OAU (now AU). African leaders are, however, far more aware of the threat to regional security posed by internal conflicts. This was reflected in the second principle of the 1991 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa which stated that the security, stability and development of every African country is

inextricably linked with those of other African countries.124

Consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other countries. Nigeria shared the joy of the return to democracy by Liberia. Additionally, the then Nigeria’s president, Gen. Babangida served as the Chairman of ECOWAS thrice while the community’s secretariat in Abuja – a project mainly funded by Nigeria was completed.ECOMOG peacekeeping operation ended in February 1998 but contingents of

5000 troops remain behind in capacity building roles.

The main problem that the Nigerian military operating under ECOMOG faced on the ground during the seven years of intervention in Liberia was the proliferation of fighting factions. The responsibility of securing a fragmented country that was under the control of many warlords became acute. During the civil war in Liberia, the criminal exploitation of natural

123A. A. Abubakar“Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience…,” 188.

124Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa, “The Role of Nigeria in

Peacekeeping…,” 43.

resources had flourished, existing in a climate of competition between the warlords. These warlords were more motivated by the occupation of more territories for their profitable criminal activities than they were for peace.125The leaders of fighting factions were encouraged to pursue their predatory policies in order to draw more wealth to support the effort of war and recruit more rebels to fortify their movements by the availability of exportable resources. This added up to the peculiarity of challenges the Nigerian military faced in peacekeeping operations.

Nigeria-Sierra Leone Peace Keeping Operations, 1998-1999

The crisis in Sierra Leone generated by the struggle for political power, educational imbalance and different colonial experience of the geo-political areas.126 This situation bred suspicion, fear and prejudices, where lives were exploited by opposing political camps. Additionally, improper involvement of the armed forces led to successive military coups and decline in military professionalism. This situation led to institutional failures and corruption, thus, fuelling ethnicity and loss of confidence in the government

Ahmad TejanKabbah was elected president of Sierra Leone on 17th march, 1996 and on May25, 1997 Ahmad TejanKabbah and his democratically elected Government were overthrown in a bloody coup led by Major Koromah’s dissident military officers and rebels from Sierra Leone’s long standing insurgency. ECOWAS Heads of Government at the 20th Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government extended the scope of activity and mandate of ECOMOG to cover Sierra Leone. This was signed in Abuja on August 29,

1997, to monitor and supervise ceasefire violations, enforce the sanctions regime and the embargo instituted by the authority of Heads of States and Government against the illegal

regime and undertake any other assignment in Sierra Leone as may be given by the

125Clement Adibe: the Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS Partnership,The Third World Quarterly 18 no. 3 (1997): 478.

126S. K. Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…., 113.

authority.127In February 1998, ECOMOG troops with contingents from Ghana, Guinea, Maliand Nigeria restored constitutional legality and reinstated the government of the democratically elected government.128

The intervention of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leoneeventually led to the re-instatement of President Ahmed Kabbah and the restoration of democratic institutions in Sierra Leone.In March 10, 1998, a peace keeping force under Nigerian leadership with considerable help from a British/Africa mercenary from a local paramilitary (the (Kamajor), entered Freetown,

and restored Kabbah and his government.129  The motives of the Nigerian intervention were

twofold: there was a natural desire for regional security, but General Sani Abacha also wanted international legitimacy for his regime which was being discredited by the international community. The initial success of the peace keepers helped obscure some of the troubling aspects of the intervention – the lack of an international mandate, the use of mercenary in peace keeping operations and the very undemocratic nature of the Nigerian

regime.130     At the peak of the operations, ECOMOG had 13, 000 troops in the country which

conducted the operations.131  Late in 1999 the disputants in the sierra Leonean conflict signed an agreement in Lome, Togo, to end the crisis; thus paving the way for UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone).132

In Sierra Leone also, there were challenges of inadequate knowledge of the forest terrain, and the difficulty to counter the guerrilla tactics employed so efficiently by the RUF. Some members of troops from the Nigerian contingent complained of lack of motivation toengage

in vigorous combat against the rebels, insufficient allowances, low wages,and long periods of

127S. K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 138.

128Charles. B. Azgaku, “The Role of Nigeria in Peace-Keeping Operation in West Africa:1960 – 2010,”

Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 5, no. 22(2015): 90.

129Andrew McGregor, “Quagmire in West Africa: Nigerian Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone (1997-98)”

International Journal 54, no. 3 (1999): 483-485.

130Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa. “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping…,

43.

131EnemuoAnifowose, Elements of Politics(Lagos: Iroansi Publication, 1999).

132Ibid.

deployment, all culminating inlow morale.133Consequently, disciplinary problems related to poorliving conditions were evident. A significant number of officers werereportedly involved in the illicit diamond trade for personal profit.

The Nigerian military also gained from the use of joint forces, employing the combined tactical showmanship of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In Liberia and Sierra Leone for instance, ECOMOG peace support forces for the first time made use of elements of her Navy

and Air Force in their operations.134  Virtually all the ships and tugboats of the Nigerian Navy

were engaged in the Liberian operation codenamed Operation Liberty. These included the following: NNS Ambe, NNS Damisa, NNS Ekpe, NNS Erinomi, NNS Enyimiri, NNS Ohue, NNS Agu, NNS Ayam, NNS Ekun, NNS Tug Dolphin and NNS Tug Mira as well as NNS Tug Rudolf Forbes.135 These Nigerian naval vessels spearheaded the movement of troops from Sierra Leone to Liberia at the commencement of Operation Liberty in August 1999.136

The Nigerian Navy under ECOMOG provided constant gunfire and cover that made possible the initial amphibious landing of ECOMOG troops. The ECOMOG Air Task Force (EATF) made up predominantly of the Nigerian Air Force was also deployed as part of ECOMOG peace support force in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Four Alpha jets with 30mm canons and

68mm rockets, and their support equipment and personnel, were deployed and gave tactical air support in the operations.137  The complement of equipment and armament comprised fighter aircraft, helicopters, aircraft engineering and aircraft armaments. Air power was

employed to provide strategic air support and cover for the ground force. Moreover, C-130

133Mohamed Belmakki, “African Sub-Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Making: The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS),” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 2005.

134S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 219.

135S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 221-222; See also, AdedoyinOmede, “The

Nigerian Army and Peace Support Operations under the ECOWAS: The ECOMOG Years,” in The Nigerian

Army in Global Security ed., John W. T. Gbor, (Lagos: Megavons (West Africa) Ltd., 2004), 207-208.

136S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 222.

137S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 228

aircrafts carried out airlift operations in Freetown, Sierra Leone. According to S. K. Oni, EATF made a total of 2,732 combat sorties, expending about 93.79 tons of ammunition.138

The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations within Nigeria before 1999

Post-independence Nigeria showed some remarkable degree of vulnerability to violent civil unrest. During the First Republic, the conflicts were essentially political in character with ethnic or regionalist undertone, and climaxing in the civil war of 1967-1970. In the Second Republic (1979-1983) the crises showed clear manifestation of economic stress but seeking refuge under religious leadership. However, the task of maintaining internal security, preserving public safety and order, is primarily the responsibility of the police. Indeed, the police is the first layer of defence in the event of breakdown of law and order. The military is often deployed as the last resort to act in aid of civil authority when the incompetence of the police has been proved beyond doubt in the face of escalating and uncontrollable violence. Consequently, the Nigerian military have carried out counterinsurgency in the form of internal security operations. It is safe to christen such internal security operations as domestic peacekeeping operations quite different from external peacekeeping operations carried out by the Nigerian military outside Nigeria.

In post-independence Nigeria, the 1960 and 1964 Tiv Crisis, the 1980 Maitatsine riots in

Kano, the 1984 Maitatsine Riots in Kano, the 1995 Maitatsine Riots in Gombe, the 1987

Kafanchan Crises, the 1990 Ife-Modakeke Conflict, the 1992 ZangonKataf Crisis, the 1991-

1992Tiv-Jukun Crises, the 1992 Jukun-Ketub Conflict, and the 1993 Ogoni Crisis in the Niger Delta are few examples of crisis spots where the Nigerian military have been deployed to carry out internal peacekeeping roles.139

138 S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 232

139Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria, 1960-1993(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2003), 243.

In previous Tiv crisis in April 1960 and August 1961, the Nigerian military were deployed to reinforce the police for short periods. However, in the February 1964 Tiv crisis, civilian participants were drawn from the rank of ex-military personnel that just returned from the Congo civil war as well as other ex-military personnel that participated in World War II. In November 1964, in accordance with the powers vested on the Prime Minister for the use of military forces in maintenance of public order, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa ordered the military to take immediate steps to ensure a return to normal life in crisis torn Tiv division. In the Tiv case, the Nigerian military were not deployed to reinforce the police, but replace

them. The operation was christened Operation Adam III. A whole Battalion (3 NA) including the Recce Squadron were mobilized for the task. The police admitted their failure and the propriety of the military invitation thus:

It became apparent from the nature of the disturbances that the troubles had changed from civil disturbance to armed guerrilla warfare with a distinct military air to the activities of the rioters. Under the circumstances it was decided to hand over the maintenance of order to the Army as it was clear that the disorders had degenerated into a military

action.140

In February, 1966, Isaac AdakaBoroformed the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) and used the platform to lead what he called a revolution attempting to create the Niger Delta Republic. The NDVS received paramilitary training in camps domiciled in the creeks of the Niger Delta. He formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed militia with members consisting of his fellow Ijaw ethnic groups.141  Isaac Boro and his men “12-Day Revolution” was provoked by what they saw as social neglect, ethnic chauvinism, political

140M. Gambo, The Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Security Organisation Relationship(Lagos: Force

Headquarters, June 1985).

141E. E. Okafor, “Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State Responses: The State of Terrorism and

Terrorism of the State,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 13, no. 2 (2011): 90.

marginalization and economic deprivation, orchestrated by Nigeria’s post-independent ruling elites.142In one of his extracts, he pontificated:

Economic development of the area is certainly the most appalling aspect. There is not even a single industry. The only fishery industry which ought to be situated in a properly riverine area is sited about 80 miles inland at Aba. The boatyard at Opobo had its headquarters at Enugu … Personnel in these industries and also in the oil stations are

predominantly non-Ijaw.143

He led an armed protest against the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta areas. They eventually set up a military camp at Taylor Creek. Their recruits were given training in the use of firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes. Eventually, they managed to muster a force of about 150 men, and split into three divisions.144  Boro designated himself “General Officer Commanding the NDVS and Leader of the Liberation Government.”145  He declared as invalid all former agreements on crude oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta carried out by the Government of Nigeria and its multinational

oil partners. All existing and new oil companies in the Niger Delta were to renew agreements with the new Niger Delta Republic headed by Boro. The new leader of the Niger Delta Republic set up a provisional senate and constitution. They landed inTontonbau in the Niger Delta and launched a guerrilla battle against the Federal Military Government of Major- General J.T.U. AguiyiIronsi.After overpowering the police, the Nigerian military were deployed to intercept the insurgency.Despite the difficult terrain and complex topography of the Niger Delta, Boro and his men were defeated by the Nigerian military within twelve days. During the Tiv-Jukun crisis which began in October 1991, the Nigerian military were called

upon when the conflict profoundly escalated in 1992. The deployment was christened

142T. Tebekaemi. (ed.), The Twelve-Day Revolution, (Benin-city: Umeh Publishers, 1982), 120.

143Ibid.

144E. E. Okafor, “Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State Responses: the State of Terrorism and

Terrorism of the State”…, 90.

145Isaac J. A. Boro, The Twelve Day Revolution (Benin City: IdodoUmeh Publishers, 1982).

Operation Tofa/Mesa. A battalion of troops composed of infantry from 4 Motorised Battalion in Takum and armoured unit from 15 Armoured Brigade in Yola was assembled under Colonel Abdul MumuniAminu, the Brigade Commander and Lieutenant Colonel O. M. AppahCommanding Officer of 4 Motorised Battalion as second in command. In 1993, following an eruption of the perennial Jukun-Kuteb conflict in Takum Local Government Area, the Nigerian military were again deployed when the police seemed ineffective in the face of escalating violence. A company was drafted from the 4 Motorised Battalion under the

command of Captain Lampai to carry out the role of peacekeeping.146

On arrival, the first thing the military did was to cut off the resupply route of the contending forces – in the case of the Tiv from Benue and the Jukunfrom Taraba. Once these supply routes were effectively blocked, the patrols (mobile and foot) became fully operational.147

Cordon and search operations carried out to retrieve weapons began about the third week of

the arrival of the military when hostilities between the contending groups had been halted. The next state of the operation involved measures to win the hearts and minds of the local population by instilling confidence. Women and children who had gone into hiding were encouraged to return. Peacekeeping troops deployed to the area were also chosen among

those that were fluent in Tiv and Jukun and/or Hausa languages but not necessarily indigenes. This assisted in confidence building.

Maitatsine is a generic term for religious disturbances which plagued Northern Nigeria between December 1980 and April 1985.148During the Maitatsine insurgency in Kano the

Nigerian military encountered fierce resistance. The topography and terrain also constituted a

146T. N. Tamuno, Peace and Violence in Nigeria(Ibadan: Panel on Nigeria since Independence History Project,

1991).

147S. G. Best, A. E. Idyorough and Z.  B. Shehu, “Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflicts

Resolution in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba

State,  in  O.  Otiteand  I Olawale  (eds),    Community Conflicts  in  Nigeria:  Management,  Resolution  and

Transformation(Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2001), 83-86.

148Victor A. Elaigwu, “The Military and Management of Religious Violence in Nigeria: The Maitatsine Crisis in Jimeta-Yola, 1984,” in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1980 Volume Two: Governance and Conflict Management, A. M. Yakubu, R. T. Adegboye, C. N. Ubah and B. Dogo, eds., (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005): 741.

challenge for the Nigerian military. In the Kano encounter, against the glaring police inability to suppress the uprising, the Nigerian military drew up an operational order which took effect from December 28, 1980. The order required all soldiers to be in their location at 0200 hours while the actual attack on the insurgent’s enclave was to commence at 0630 hours. The Nigerian Air Force carried out aerial reconnaissance backed by photographs of Yan Awaki. By 0700 bours, the Nigerian military carried out heavy bombardment on Maitatsine’s

enclave. The military operation was swift and decisive. At about 1030 hours of December 29,

1980, the operation was brought to an end.149

The GOC 1 Mechanised Division, Major General David Jemibewon came to Kano from Kaduna and after conducting an on-the-spot assessment of the situation decided to hand over the operation to the police.150The armoured tanks used for the operation came from 202

Armoured Battalion in Kaduna. The operation was commanded by Major HaliluAkilu,

Commanding Officer of 146 Infantry Battalion which was assigned the task of quelling the insurgency. As argued by Elaigwu,151although the sheer awesomeness of the full force of the Nigerian military mobilised against the insurgents may appear like cracking a nut with a

sledge hammer, however, considered against the scale of violence unleashed by the insurgents, there appeared very little else the authorities could have done to bring about a quick decisive resolution of the crisis.

The military operation in Jimeta-Yola followed more or less the same pattern. The Jimeta insurgency was the fourth in the series of the Maitatsine insurgencies after those of Kano (December 1980), Bullumkuttu (October 1982) and Rigasa (October 1982). However, it was only the second such incident after the uprising in Kano requiring the commitment of military

force. Unlike the military operation in Kano which was conducted under a civilian

149Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria…, 149.

150NIPSS Research Department, “Project on Religious Disturbances in Nigeria Final Report on Kano/Kaduna

Sector,” (nd).

151Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria…, 150.

government, the Jimeta-Yola action took place under military rule. Following the quelling of the disturbances in Bullukuttu and Rigasa by the Police in October 1982 the population of the fanatics in Jimeta were reinforced by new arrivals necessitating the acquisition of new houses by Musa Makaniki in Vilikilang and Doubeli.

Lieutenant Colonel G. P. Okiki of 5 Battalion was assigned the task. A company of 5

Battalion with support units was the first to move around 0400 hours on March 3, 1984. At about 0600 hours, the insurgent’s enclave of Doubeli came under heavy mortar fire. The heavily built-up area of Doubeli was reduced to rubble with the help of the long range weapons used by the Nigerian military. The Commanding Officer of 15 Mechanised Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Iweze handed over the operation to the Gongola state

Commissioner of Police, Mr. NuhuAliyu, bringing the crisis to a close.152

In the 1987 crisis in Kaduna state, an orgy of violence swept across many towns and cities of Kaduna state. The 1987 Kafanchan riot was ignited by theological disagreement between Christian and Muslim students of the Kafanchan Teachers College, Kafanchan.153First, on

March 5th 1987, there was a squabble between the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS)

and the Muslim Students Society (MSS) over an evangelical campaign organised by the Fellowship of Christian Students tagged “Mission 87.” The MSS group protested over the banner hoisted on the college gate with an inscription “Mission 87 in Jesus Campus,” the school authority intervened to quell the protest.154

In Kaduna metropolis, churches and personal property were destroyed in many areas including Abakpa, UnwanShanu, UnguwanKanawa and Tudun Wada. In Zaria, save for the Ahmadu Bello University’s Kongo Conference Hotel, Emanto Guest Inn and Nira Hotel, all hotels were burnt down. Only few churches survived the carnage. Armoured vehicles

152GongolaState  of  Nigeria,  Report  of  the  Administrative  Committee  of  Enquiry  into  the  Maitatsine

Disturbances of February27th to March 3rd1984 in Jimeta (n.d.)

153Hussaini Abdu, Clash of Identities: State, Society and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria(Kaduna: DevReach Publishers Nigeria, Ltd, 2010): 131.

154Ibid.

regularly patrolled major roads especially highly volatile areas such as Tudun Wada, Kawo and UnguwarSarki. As the situation continued to deteriorate, and police inadequacies became very glaring, the General Officer Commanding 1 Mechanised Division, Major General Peter Ademokhai sought the permission of the Chief of Army Staff to use military force to quell

the disturbances. However, the police were not withdrawn, but combined to carry out a joint military/police operation. Over 2000 personnel of the Nigerian military were deployed. Churches and Mosques were heavily guarded by personnel of the Nigerian military.155

The ZangonKataf crisis of February and May, 1992 was another crisis sufficient in intensity

to attract the deployment of the Nigerian military. ZangonKataf, located about one hundred and fifty kilometres south-east of Kaduna had been the scene of uneasy communal relationship between native Kataf community and its Hausa-Fulani settlers.Violent conflict erupted in ZangonKataf between the Atyab and Hausa community of Zango over the control and relocation of ZangonKataf Market from its original location.156When violence seemed uncontrollable in the face of the incompetence of the police, personnel of the Nigerian military drawn predominantly from the Army and Air Force were drafted to assist the police

contain the crisis.

Sections of the Nigerian military were also deployed to Gokhana kingdom when the indigenes protested the devastation of their farms by Wilbros, a contractor of Shell BP. However, the troops were withdrawn after their mission of cowing the people was accomplished. However, with the subsequent withdrawal of Shell from Ogoniland and the continued sabotage of oil installations, the government of General Sanni Abacha decided to abandon any conciliatory policy. The responsibility of managing the mutating insurgency in Ogoniland fell on the Rivers state Governor, Lieutenant Colonel DaudaKomo. In April 1994,

the Rivers state government came up with Operation Order 4/94. Christened “Restoration of

155White Paper on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State

6th to 12th March, (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1987).

156Rotimi T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1996),54.

Law and Order in Ogoniland,” the counterinsurgency operation was justified on the claim that “law and order gradually died down (sic) in the areawhich constitutes (sic) Gokhana and Khana Local Government Areas towards the close of 1993.”157

The operation envisaged a joint service takeover of Ogoniland, with the Nigeria police

contributing 406 officers and men and the Nigerian military contributing similar number of troops drawn from the Army, Navy and Air Force. It was christened Rivers State Internal Security Task Force under the command of Major Paul Okuntimoh. This was another time

the joint police/military operational command was set up to manage civil violence. The use of road blocks, cordon and search, mounting of patrols, enforcement of curfew were employed

in the Ogoni crisis.158

Table 2.I: Military Operations in Civil Crisis Showing Units of the Military Deployed, Commanding Officers and Duration of Operation

INCIDENT	UNIT OF THE	COMMANDING	DURATION OF
	MILITARYDEPLOYED	OFFICER	OPERATION
February 1964	5 Battalion, Kaduna (one company only deployed)	Lt. Col. A. C. UnegbeCapt. T. Onwatuegwu	2 weeks
November 1964	3 Battalion, Kaduna RecceSquadron	Lt. Col. J. Y. Pam	Over 14 months
		Maj. Anuforo
Western Region	2 QONR, Abeokuta
(1962)
Niger Delta	1 Battalion, Enugu	Maj. D. S. Ogunewe	2 weeks
insurrection (1966)
May 1966 Riots	5 Battalion, Kano	Col. M. Shuwa	2 days
(Kano)(Katsina)	5 BattalionKatsina	Col. M. Shuwa	1 day
1978 Students crisis	Army depot, Zaria		1 day

157Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: The Judgement (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, December

1995), 20.

158Tell, 13 November, Lagos, 1995.

(ABU, Samaru
Campus)
Maitatsine (Kano)	146 Infantry Battalion, Kano	Maj. HaliruAkilu	28 hours
Maitatsine (Yola)	15 Mechanised Brigade Yola (5Battalion, Yola)	Lt. Col. C. C. Iweze	3 days
		(Lt. Col. G. P. Okiki)
Maitatsine (Gombe)	231 Tank Battalion,Gombe		1 day
Kaduna State (1987)	1 Mechanised Division	Maj. Gen. P.	2 days
		Ademokhar
Bauchi State (1991)	ACCS (Demo	Col. A. D. Umar	2 days
	Battalion)Bauchi
Bauchi State (1991)	23 Armoured	Col. A. O. Fayomi	1 day
	BrigadeBauchi
ZangonKataf	1 Mechanised Division	Brig-Gen. A. Daku	3 days
Jukun-Tiv	4 Motorised	Col. A. Aminu	3 months in the firstInstance. Continued 5yrs subsequently.
	BattalionTakum,15 Infantry
	Brigade, Yola.3Division	(Lt. Col. OM Appa)
	Headquarters,  Jos
Jukun-Kuteb	4 Motorised Battalion	Lt. Col. J. O. Oladosu	Over 2 years
	Takum Company (1 deployed)	Capt. Lampai)
Ogoni Crisis	RSIS Task Force	Maj. P. Okuntimoh	Over 5 years

Source: Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria, 1960-1993, Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2003, p. 243.

Table 2. I shows that in three decades of post-independence Nigeria, a myriad of low and high intensity conflicts have been witnessed. Some of the conflicts have been recurrent, pervasive and endemic.

Conclusion

The Nigerian military has participated in peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. Consequently, the counterinsurgency capacity of the Nigerian military has been put to test. In its well over 25 peacekeeping missions within and outside Africa, the Nigerian military has acquired novel experience, skills, and technology that proves beneficial to

attaining higher standards of professionalism. As it concerns internal security operations, the degree of violence, the number of casualties, the degree of destruction inflicted on property and quality of weapons employed, determined the deployment of the Nigerian military. The riots of Tiv division in the 1960s, the Maitatsine insurgency in 1980 and 1984 in Kano and Jimeta respectively, and the ZangonKataf crisis in 1992 required the deployment of the Nigerian military given the apparent loss of control by the Nigeria police.

From the political crisis among the Tiv in central Nigeria to the various communal unrests in different parts of Nigeria in the 1990s; from the religious conflicts in various parts of Norther Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s to the socio-economic unrests among the Ogoni in the 1990s, the Nigerian military has shown robust capacity for managing mutating forms of

insurgencies. Consequently, it appears safe to conclude that these experiences influenced the

Nigerian military in their peacekeeping role in the Niger Delta subsequently.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY, 1999-2009

Introduction

The previous chapter showed the degree of proliferation of domestic crisis in Nigeria since 1960. Given the intensity of violence  and the need to protect lives and  properties, sections  of  the  Nigerian  military  were  often  deployed  to  domestic  trouble  spots  across Nigeria. In post-independence  Nigeria, the Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro led  insurgency in the Niger Delta saw the deployment of sections of the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military

under the umbrella of the 3rd  Marine Commando Division (3MCD) was deployed again to

suppress Biafran secessionist aspirations in the Niger Delta area of Bonny, Port Harcourt and Calabar. The Federal Government of Nigeria in 1999 deployed the military under Operation Hakuri on the Niger Delta communities of Ogbogbene, Smoothgbene, Tenigbene, Sandfield, Mila Waterside and Makiva Waterside to suppress domestic insurgency.

The  renewed  insurgency  in  the  Niger  Delta  after  1999  manifested  itself  in  the destruction of oil facilities and infrastructures, killing of security and oil personnel, oil theft (bunkering), kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom. The activities of insurgents in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states went on relatively unchallenged  to an extent that it was termed “hopeless.” The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 as a civil measure to manage the crisis. In 2003 the Joint Task Force (JTF) was established as a military measure to ensure security of oil installations and maintain stability in the region, and in 2009 the signing of the  Amnesty Deal which is arguably to be the most successful non-military  method  in the  attainment  of peace in the region. This chapter  examines  the nature of the Niger Delta insurgency after Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 through

a narrative and analytical filter. The chapter interrogates the particulars of the Niger  Delta insurgency within a post-democratic chronological space of ten years (1999 – 2009), bringing to the fore the utility of military deployment in managing the runaway insurgency.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2003

After decades of military rule, Nigeria returned to democratic rule in May 1999. The end of military rule and emergence of civil rule in Nigeria appeared to have held fortunes of a new start for good and responsive  governance.  For a significant  population of the Niger Delta, a democratic government  implied emancipation from  the  relative deprivation  faced during years of military rule. Social movements were argued to spring up in the Niger Delta along the “deprived actor” theoretical line of thinking. Such postulations highlight grievances as an important cause of insurgency and explain the link between relative deprivation and violent behaviour. Arguably, a significant cause of grievance among insurgent groups in the Niger  Delta  bordered  on  the  authoritative  allocation  of  oil  benefits  and  the  attendant environmental consequences of oil production. As military rule relied upon repression against any  form   of  civil  protest,   relative   deprivation-perceived   discrepancy   between   value

expectations  and  value  capabilities159in  the  Niger  Delta  produced  discontent  and   this

discontent produced dissent. By 1999, relative deprivation in the Niger Delta appeared  to have followed Ted Gurr’s chain: first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.160

It appears safe to argue that during the extensive period of military rule,  perceived

relative deprivation in the Niger Delta generated grievances and grievances together with oil

159J. C. Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27, no. 1(1962): 6; T. R. Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics 20, no. 2(1968): 245; T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13; H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 598.

160T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel…, 12-13.

bearing identification resulted in general behavioural dissent. Graham and Gurr call this the “frustration-aggression”  mechanism.161   In the Niger Delta, such discontent  which  implied inequality, was not a function of the dissimilarity between what people in the  Niger Delta

wanted and what they had; rather, it was a function of discrepancy between what they wanted and what they expect to get given the fact that crude oil – the main stay of Nigeria’s economy was solely mined in the Niger Delta.162  The end of military rule and the return of democratic

rule appeared  to have provided  the much needed  opportunity  to vent discontent  through

collective violence.

The return to democratic rule in 1999 also meant a reverse in state repression carried out by previous  federal military governments  on budding and existing social  movements concerned  with  the  plight  of  the  Niger  Delta.  Consequently,  the  return  to  democracy paralleled renewed hopes of justice and equity, especially for the Niger Delta. At the same time, the return to democratic rule provided a rather convenient  space for the budding of various radical social movements that had been underground during military rule. Most of the social movements and their leaders acquired armed capability and political clout as dominant political  parties  sought  their  services  to  secure  popular  votes  for  the  1999  and  2003 gubernatorial   elections.   Such   social   movements   primarily   composed   of   young   men dissatisfied at their inability to find jobs, gradually became classified as militant groups with their fun acquisition of weapons and ammunition. They also updated their methods from the non-violence  employed  earlier  on  by  the  Movement  for  the  Survival  of  Ogoni  people (MOSOP) to a regular use of violence.

From 1999, the Niger Delta crisis appeared to have shifted from the frequent Ijaw-

Itshekiri wars in Warri over access to benefits accruing from oil rents on contested lands to an

161Arguably, it is not the absolute level of deprivation that leads to grievances, but instead the contrast between what a person has and what he or she expects to have. See, H. D. Graham and T. R.  Gurr, Violence in America…, 598.

162T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel…, 358.

organized  attack  on  oil  companies  operating  in  the  Niger  Delta.163   The  attack  on  oil companies  and its personnel also involved  the frequent vandalisation of oil  pipelines that crisscrossed delicate areas in the Niger Delta. Most attacks were designed to extort short-term funds or municipal development projects from multinational oil  companies.  Consequently, the Federal Government perceived such acts as economic sabotage capable of crippling the

economy of Nigeria. By 2003, most attacks moved away from communities and cities and receded  into  the creeks and  swamps  which provided  concealment  for the  perpetrators  of violent attack on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure. With pressure mounted by the presence of the Nigerian   military   in  the  Niger  Delta,   insurgent   groups   became   more   sophisticated, increasingly sharing a common goal of “resource control.”

Between 1999 and 2003, insurgent groups in the Niger Delta were basically involved in intergroup violence.164  Much of the intergroup violence was basically ethnic  as the Ijaw made serious attempts to assert themselves as the harbinger of the Niger Delta struggles with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 1998.165 The IYC’s demands included self- determination, resource control and environmental sustainability, was considered a challenge

to authority in the state and the source of a potential Ijaw uprising in the Niger Delta. The transition to democracy in 1999 exacerbated youth militancy as unscrupulous politicians used hired “thugs” to carry out violence to ensure their victory at the polls. Given their connections to powerful political barons during the 1999 and 2003 general  elections, insurgent groups clashed with one another as they attempted to secure popular votes for dominant political

parties. This was significantly evident in Rivers state. During this period, insurgent groups

163Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election

Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria,” 20, no. 3(March 2008).

164Judith Burdin Asuni, “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta,” Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace,

2009.

165Cyril Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict,”

Africa Development XXXIV, no. 2(2009): 109.

were mostly known as gangs. They consisted mostly of cult groups such as Supreme Vikings

Confraternity, Icelanders, Deewell, Deebam, Outlaws, among others.166

Gang  violence  spread  to  other  Rivers  State  communities.  In  the  worst-affected communities like Ogbogoro, cult gangs carried out a reign of terror that  included murder, rape, and other violent crimes.167  The clashes between the groups  primarily represented  a

violent competition for access to illegal patronage doled out by public officials in the state

government.  In 2001,  with the  financial  support  of the state  government,  Asari  Dokubo became president of the IYC and subsequently used this position to exploit divisions between the Ijaw in different states and recruit youths to help ensure Odili’s re-election in 2003.168

Prior to the 2003 elections,  then-Governor  Peter Odili and his political  associates

lavishly funded criminal gangs that helped rig the election into a landslide victory for  the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP).169  Those gangs used the money at their disposal to procure  sophisticated  weapons  and  became  better  armed  than  the  police.  Consequently,

Rivers’ post-election gang warfare spiraled out of control. Arguably, the epidemic of violence that plagued much of the Niger Delta during this period had its roots in the corrupt, violent, and unaccountable nature of politics in the region. For instance, in Rivers state, there was an established link between politics, corruption, and violence.

Between 1999 and 2003, crime and political violence grew in stride in the face of the colossal  failures  of governance  in Niger  Delta.  Given that  politics  meant  the  control  of government machinery for the authoritative distribution of resources, national, state, and local elections were consistently rigged by means of violence and fraud since 1999. The oil wealth

in the Niger Delta appeared to have considerably increased the financial spoils of political

166Human  Rights  Watch(HRW),  “Nigeria’s  2003  Elections:  The  Unacknowledged Violence,”  June  2004. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604

167Human Rights Watch, “Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,” February, 2005.

168Ibid.

169Human   Rights   Watch(HRW),    “Nigeria:   Polls   Marred   by   Violence   Fraud,”   April   17,   2007. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm.

office. Indeed, a political culture that views politics as a kind of war was the order of the day in the Niger Delta during the 1999 and 2003 general elections. As one interviewee in Rivers state expressed:

We  want  to  point  our  fingers  at  our   ambitious Nigerian   politicians   who   amassed   weapons   for jobless youth. Life in our community used to be very vibrant. This community used to be the pride of the Akpor Kingdom. Suddenly things started getting out of hand, just before the2003 election. We saw signs of arms trafficking, arms flowed into the community. When reports of this were made to the police force they treated it with levity. They [the politicians] were

above the law.170

Since 1999,  insurgents  in the Niger Delta of Nigeria  have changed  the tactics  of engagement  with  the  Nigerian  government  and  the  multi-national  oil  companies  from peaceful protests and demonstrations to violent protests. One of the strengths of insurgents in the Niger Delta which also define their basic peculiarity is the fact that  they have broad membership  drawn from the local grass root. Insurgents have a  membership,  support and cooperation across the states and communities that make up the Niger Delta. This provides them the opportunity and ease to network.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2003 and 2005

From 2003, there was a direct link between gang violence and the corruption  and criminality of many politicians in the Niger Delta. Many ineffective political  leaders kept themselves  in place by violently rigging elections, relying on gangs of  armed thugs. The money they use to fund, arm, and support these gangs was arguably generated by the corrupt practices carried out by desperate politicians. However, once the politicians assumed office,

they either abandoned  the well-armed  gangs or continued  to use them to intimidate  their

170Human Rights Watch (HRW), Interview with local leader (name withheld), Ogbogoro, Rivers State, October

10, 2007.

opponents. Between 2003 and 2005, cult groups used for election rigging metamorphosed into seeming “insurgent” groups with significant leadership structure.171

In Rivers state for instance, during the 2003 election cycle, state government officials working  with  then-Rivers   State  Governor   Peter   Odili  and  then-Federal   Minister   of Transportation Abiye Sekibo armed and hired criminal gangs to ensure the successful rigging

of Rivers’ polls in favour of the People’s Democratic Party.172  As far back as 2001, Abiye

Sekibo, provided logistical support and political protection to local youth leader Tom Polo to help  counter  the  influence  of  the  opposition,  the  All  Nigeria  People’s  Party  (ANPP), particularly   in   Okrika   local   government   area,   during   the    2003state   and   federal elections.173During  this  period,  Tom  Polo  was  given  free  rein  to  carry  out  profitable bunkering activities in exchange for his group’s violent services during the 2003 elections.

Arguably, the two most prominent gangs armed by PDP politicians during the 2003 campaigns were the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dukobo, and the Icelanders turned Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom.174  Ateke Tom

rose from obscurity during Rivers state 2003 elections when he was paid and armed by state

government officials to help drive opposition supporters out of his hometown of Okrika.175

Not long after the polls, Asari of the NDPVF fell out with his sponsors in the Rivers state government. State government officials responded by encouraging Ateke Tom’s Icelanders to break Asari’s group by force. By late 2003, Asari’s and Ateke’s gangs were openly at war with one another. Some of the most intense fighting between  Asari’s NDPVF and Tom’s NDV occurred between October 2003 and October 2004 and centered around villages located on  tributaries  about  twenty  to  forty  kilometers  south  west  of  Port  Harcourt,  including

171Human Rights Watch (HRW), Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State…, 17-20.

172Ibid., 18.

173Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria,” 15, no. 8(April 2003).

174Human Rights Watch, “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 10.

175Okafor Ofiebor, “Portrait of Ateke Tom,” The News September 13, 2004.

Buguma, Bukuma, Tombia, and Ogbakiri.176  These communities constitute Asari’s home area and the site of several oil wells, flow stations and gas gathering projects operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company in the Caw Thorne Channel.

The conflict between Asari and Ateke had a devastating effect on the residents’  of Port Harcourt and surrounding communities. In the fighting between their gangs, dozens of local people were killed and tens of thousands fled their homes. Hundreds of gang members were also killed. From late 2003, thousands of local people in and around Tombia, Buguma, Ogbakiri and Bukuma were forced to flee as Asari’s NDPVF  and  Tom’s NDV launched attacks and counter attacks. The fighting intensified between January and May 2004 and the majority of the population left during this period.

On August 22, 2004  at night, about fifty members  of Asari’s NDPVF  attacked a densely populated slum settlement called Njemanze on the Port Harcourt waterfront. At that time the area was controlled  by an armed  group  called  the  Njemanze  Vigilante  Service. Asari’s  fighters  first  fired  gunshots  around  the  settlement  and  then  set  fire to  about  30

homes.177  By mid-August2004  Asari’s NDPVF stepped up its attacks, launching raids  on

several areas of Port Harcourt,  including  Marine  Base,  Sangana  Street  and Warri  Street, bringing the fighting to Port Harcourt metropolis. By late August 2004 armed  violence in Rivers state had risen to a high point of intolerance that the federal government ordered the Nigerian military to intervene and stop it.178 In September 2004 the then-President Olusegun Obasanjo invited both Asari and Ateke to the national capital Abuja for peace negotiations, which resulted in a truce between the two gangs. But the underlying causes of the violence that their clashes represented were never meaningfully addressed.179  Neither gang made any

176Okafor Ofiebor, “Who is Alhaji Dokubo-Asari?” The News September 13, 2004.

177Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria,” 15 no. 8(April 2003).

178Sola Odunfa, “Nigeria’s Oil Capital under Siege” BBC News September 8, 2004.

179A Harvest of Guns, Niger Delta Project for Environment Human Rights and Development, August 2004.

good-faith effort to disarm, and none of the politicians implicated in arming the gangs and sponsoring the violence was held to account in any way.

When it appeared that such gangs-turned-insurgent groups could not attract significant funding from the state government, they resorted to oil bunkering. Indeed,  most gangs that suddenly assumed the status of insurgent groups amassed revenue  through involvement  in

illegal activities ranging from the bunkering trade in stolen crude oil and bank robberies.180  A

widespread sense of grievance appeared to have developed among many gang members in the Niger Delta who feel that their former political sponsors had reneged on  promises of money, jobs, or education. Indeed most of the promises leveraged to gang members for help with rigging the 2003 elections were rapidly forgotten by the politicians who made them.181

But unlike those promises the gangs did not simply fade away once the polls were over.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2005 and 2009

By 2004, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari’s NDPVF and other mushrooming insurgent groups found fortification  and cover in the arteries of creeks where most of  them set up camps.  NDPVF  social  mobilisation  revolved  around  access  to  “black  market”  crude  oil through oil bunkering. Asari’s NDPVF was so notorious for oil bunkering, that its product

became  known in the Niger Delta as “Asari fuel.”182  This provided  the bulk of  finances

needed to sponsor the insurgency. To feed, clothe and arm its members, insurgent  groups need money. Unless insurgent leaders are liable to raise sufficient funds, a conflict is unlikely to start no matter how severe the grievances. Consequently, if an insurgent group is unable to meet the financial requirements, the insurgency is likely to continue for an extended period. Indeed,  Collier  and  Hoeffler  find  the viability of insurgent  movements  as a more likely explanation  for the perceived  link between  primary  commodity exports and conflict than

180Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 21.

181Ibid.

182Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 17.

greed.183  It should be stressed that it was paucity of funds that plagued the first post-colonial insurgency  in the Niger  Delta.  Adaka  Boro’s 12-day insurgency began  with a capital of

£150.184   Consequently,  Boro’s  troops  had  to  resort  to  extortionist  strategies  on  ordinary citizens in order to support the group.

In September 2005, Ebitimi Banigo an Ijaw businessman was arrested and his bank, All States Trust Bank, was shut down by the Nigerian government. At the same time, D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, the governor of Bayelsa state, was arrested in London on money laundering charges. In the same year, Dokubo-Asari, the NDPVF leader, was arrested in the government house in Port Harcourt,  and taken to Abuja, where he was  later charged  with treason  in relation to his insurgent activities in the Niger Delta.  These events increased  tensions and restiveness in the Niger Delta as the Ijaw of the Niger Delta felt that it was a deliberate target by the Federal Government on prominent personalities of Ijaw stock in the Niger Delta. It was in the process of agonising and organising that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)-an amalgam of all insurgent groups in the Niger Delta-was formed winning broad sympathy among the local population of the Niger Delta.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation  of our mineral

resources  by  the  Nigerian  government  and  oil  companies  over  the  last  fifty  years.185

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one of the largest militant groups  in the  Niger  Delta  region of Nigeria.  The  guerrilla  group  dates  its  formation  to January 11, 2006; its stated mission is to wage armed rebellion in order to regain the “birth rights  of  our  stolen  heritage.”  The  Movement’s  stated  goals  are  to  “localize  control  of

183Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource, Rents, Governance and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution

47, no. 5(2005): 626-628.

184T. Tebekaemi. ed., The Twelve-Day Revolution(Benin-city: Umeh Publishers, 1982), 120.

Nigeria’s oil, and to secure reparations from the Nigerian state for pollution caused by the oil industry.” MEND’s objective, “is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to  export  oil.”186As  regards  the  aspiration  for  victory,  MEND  through  its  spokesperson Gbomo Jomo, made it clear in 2005 that:

We   believe   that   we   will   centrally   defeat   the government on the battlefield, or spark up a popular uprising  which  would  forces   the   government   to accede  to  our  demands,  or  provoke  international intervention  on our behalf,  or prolong  the  conflict long enough  for the  government  to judge that it is

better to negotiate a settlement…187

MEND has three main hubs: the eastern Delta of Rivers state, central Bayelsa state, and the western Delta hub in Delta state. Each hub had over 30 affiliated camps and several groups. In each location, it claims to have some 2,000 fighters. It operates as a guerrilla band, using local knowledge to navigate easily the intricate creeks area. It has proven itself capable of fighting both in the creeks and in the urban areas of the Delta, such as Port Harcourt. Its members have shown some technical capacity with explosives, with the detonation of several car bombs in Port Harcourt since the group’s emergence. MEND’s violent campaign against the government  and the oil multinationals  has been  based on the tactical use of surprise attacks on strategic oil installations linked to production and exports, secrecy surrounding the

identity  of  its  core  operators,  and  a sophisticated  media  campaign.188   MEND  has  often

changed its tactics making military responses particularly difficult.189With an unprecedented

186Elias Courson,  Movement for  the  Emancipation of the  Niger Delta(MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta,Discussion Paper 47(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet,

2009), 19.

187Stephanie Hanson, “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group,” Report of Council on Foreign

Relations, 2007, 16.

188Ebiri, Kevin, and Willie Etim “Militants Hit Oil Facility, Abduct Six Foreigners,” Guardian Newspapers, July 7, 2009. http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/

189P. Naagbanton, “The Fall of Godfather Tom Ateke,” The Midweek Telegraph Port Harcourt, June 2006, 13.

amount offirepower including heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled  grenades,  MEND

has successfully attacked both oil facilities and Nigeriansecurity forces.190

Sensing that the disruption of the oil flow from the Niger Delta to the global market would have a most potent and devastating effect on the federal government, oil companies and the international community,  MEND insurgents withdrew from the cities of the Niger Delta and went into the maze of creeks. MEND, repeatedly and systematically bombed oil

pipelines,  triggering  an international  increase  in the cost of oil  globally.191It  has  proven

effective  in  reducing  oil  production  by  20–40  per  cent,  mostly  due  to  kidnappings  of expatriate  staff  from  oil operations.192   The group  has demonstrated  an awareness  of the impact  of  its  activities  on  the  oil  industry,  and  their  consequences  for  the  Nigerian government and the international community.

MEND  has  succeeded  in  gaining  international  notoriety  and  attention  for  their activities by broadcasting their intensions through the use of a spokesman and then following through with their threats.193The attacks on the infrastructure of the oil industry, particularly

oil production and oil export had the effect of cutting oil production and pushing up the price

of oil in the tight and nervous global market.Armed clashes were often recorded with military personnel who attempted to defend the poorly laid and vulnerable pipelines. Consequently, the Niger  Delta  became  an example  of petro-aggression,  justifying  what  Jeff D.  Colgan describes as “when oil causes war.”194Arguably, oil created incentives that increased the petro aggression by morphing insurgents groups in the Niger Delta. Indeed, given that the Niger

190M. Boas, “‘Mend Me’: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Empowerment of Violence,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), (London: Zed Books, 2011), 116.

191D. A. Amaraegbu, “Violence, Terrorism and Security Threat in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An Old Problem

Taking a New Dimension,” Africa Journal of Political Science and International Relations 15,no. 4(2011): 210.

192E.  Marquardt,  “Nigerian  Militants  Influencing  Election  Campaign  Terrorism  Focus,”  The  Jamestown

Foundation 4, no. 5 (2007): 4. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf_004_005.pdf.

193I. Okonta, “Behind the Mask: Explaining the Emergence of the MEND Militia in Nigeria’s Oil-Bearing Niger

Delta: Niger Delta Economies of Violence,” Working Papers No. 11 (Berkeley: University of California 2006),

13.

194Jeff D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Delta insurgency was organised around the concentration of crude oil, it appears difficult to disagree with Collier and Hoeffler’s position that insurgencies will occur where it is “viable” for groups to organize.195 Consequently, it is safe to argue that the opportunistic behaviour for organizing the Niger Delta insurgency was determined by many factors, including the socio- political and economic environment of the Niger Delta that shaped the size and nature of the payoff for investing in violence over other potentially “profitable” enterprises.

MEND  insurgency  was  surrounded  with  three  themes:  rebellion,  revolution  and secession, all tied to a resource control cause. Since its inception, MEND has articulated three major demands: the release of Asari from prison, the receipt of 50 percent of revenues from oil drilled in the Niger Delta, and the withdrawal of government troops from the Delta. Its broader aim is “resource control,” with unspecific long-term goals. While MEND’s influence spanned all the states in the Niger Delta, it  operations were relatively restricted  to Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states.MEND  differed from previous forms of domestic conflict in the Niger Delta as the degree of  coordination required was larger and the level of destruction carried out on Nigeria’s vast oil infrastructure was greater. With the formation of MEND, the power  asymmetry  between  the  government  and  insurgents  appeared  narrowed.  MEND’s attacks  significantly affected Nigeria’s oil exports, costing at least eight hundred thousand barrels per day, or over 25 percent of Nigeria’s oil output. Also, offshore oil facilities that were once regarded as safe havens from insurgent attacks came under the attack of MEND.

MEND’s  first  operation  was  on  January  11,  2006  where  a  Shell   Petroleum Development  Corporation (SPDC) oil-field located about 20km offshore  was  attacked and four expatriates, a Briton, a Bulgarian, a Honduran, and a US citizen from a Shell flow station

in Bayelsa were kidnapped by MEND insurgents after a fierce gun duel with sections of the

195Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and D. Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievances: Feasibility and Civil War,”

Oxford Economic Paper 61,no. 1 (2009): 1-2.

Nigerian  military  guarding  the  oil-field.196This  marked  its  official  inception.On  Sunday January 15,  2006,  MEND  insurgents  “attacked  and  destroyed  one  flow  station and  two military house-boats belonging to SPDC in Benisede, Bayelsa State.”  MEND also claimed responsibility for the capture of four foreign oil workers, launching itself to the international stage.

Figure 3.1: A scene of the capture of a foreign oil worker in the creeks of the Niger Delta

Source:http://www.mendnigerdelta_online_picture_archives.com, Accessed on April 26, 2014

Besides  kidnapping,  MEND  had  engaged  in most  successful  coordinated  terrorist attacks against the state and multinational companies in the Niger Delta and  beyond since

2006. For instance, in early 2006, nine officials for the Italian petrol company Eni SpA were killed when armed members of MEND attacked Eni SpA’s security forces in Port Harcourt Port. MEND militants briefly occupied and robbed a bank near the Eni SpA base, leaving at

about 3:30 p.m, about an hour after they showed up.197  On October 2 2006, 10  Nigerian

soldiers were killed off the shore of the Niger Delta in their patrol boat by a MEND mortar shell.  Earlier  that  day,  a  Nigerian/Royal  Dutch  Shell  convoy  was  attacked  in  the  Port Harcourt  region resulting  in some  people being wounded.  On June 20,  2008,  the SPDC

196Ike Okonta, “Behind the Mask: Explaining the Emergence of the MEND Militia in Nigeria’s Oil-Bearing,…; Paul Odili, “MEND: Between Criminality and Kid Gloves,” Vanguard January 29, 2007, 6.

197Ibid., 94.

operated Bonga oil platform (the largest offshore oil platform in the Niger Delta)  located

120km offshore was attacked by MEND insurgents with about 9 boats armed with RPGs and GPMGs leaving over 100 people dead, and kidnapped an American, Captain Jack Stone who worked for Tidex, an oil servicing company in the Niger Delta,198 and many more.

The attack underscored  thesophistication  of MEND insurgents and showed that  oil

platforms/facilities  (onshore  or  offshore)  were within  MEND’s  reach.MEND’s  attack  on Nigeria’s  vast  oil  infrastructure  in  the  Niger  Delta  was  complemented  with  the  regular kidnapof  foreign  oil  workers  which  replenished  its  financial  base.  Hostages  were  often released after a period of negotiations – via intermediaries – with oil company representatives and the government. Arguably, this provided a significant source of income used in oiling the wheels  of  the  insurgency  in  the  Niger  Delta.  Another  major  source  of  income  for  the insurgent groups was oil bunkering. Crude oil was  frequently looted from pipelines in the Niger Delta and sold to barges concealed in the  mangrove.199This  involved a complicated

process of tapping an oil pipeline and filling plastic cans with crude oil. The oil was then sold to locals or transported to barges offshore for transport to neighbouring West African and Gulf of Guinea countries. Illegal bunkering was estimated to amount to up to 10 percent of total daily production, or 200,000 barrels per day, in 2003.200

It  bears  emphasising  that  continuous  financing  is  crucial  to  the  survival  of  an insurgent movement and if an insurgent group is unable to meet the financial requirements, the  insurgency  is  unlikely  to  continue  for  an  extended  period.201In   many  prolonged insurgencies, insurgents are known to have had access to easily extractable natural resources.

198Akanimo Samson and Shola O’Neil, “Bonga Oil Field Attack: Yar’Adua sends Soldiers after Militants,” The

Nation 2, no. 0701 (June 21, 2008): 5.

199Human   Rights    Watch    (HRW),    “The    Warri    Crisis:   Fuelling   Violence,”   15,    no.    18    2003. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/17/warri-crisis.

200A. Ikelegbe, “Beyond the Threshold of Civil Struggle: Youth Militancy and the Militarization of the Resource

Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” African Study Monographs 27, no. 3 (2006): 100.

201Hanne Fjelde and Desiree Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups,”

Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 4 (2012): 608.

The  extortion  of  primary  commodity  resources  is especially  suited  to  the  operations  of insurgent groups, as they are often made up of unskilled labour and given whatever weapons are available. The looting of primary commodity resources appears to be the  best way for insurgents  to  maintain  financial  viability.  Examples  of such primary  commodity  include diamonds  in Sierra Leone and Angola,  timber  in Cambodia,  coca  in Columbia,  poppy in

Afghanistan, etc.202

Crude oil was the primary resource that assisted the Niger Delta insurgents to sustain the insurgency. Indeed, in the Niger Delta, oil was the insurgent’s best friend. Oil in the Niger Delta served as the “honey pot” for insurgents  and other stakeholders in  the Niger Delta insurgency.203The advantage that such a resource had was its ability to  be easily extracted without much technological investment. Support for this argument is provided by Ross, who using case studies, finds that in many prolonged insurgencies, insurgents have had access to easily extractable  natural resources.204Furthermore,  such  illicit oil businesses  provided  the opportunity to carry out an insurgency that has been widely blamed upon grievance.

The  theoretical  and  empirical  analyses  of  insurgencies  conducted  by Collier  and Hoeffler205  as well as Fearon and Laitin206  found that such opportunity factors  adequately explained the onset of civil war than grievances.  The insurgency at this  point appeared to

have  satisfied  Collier  and  Hoeffler’s  argument  civil  violence  may  be  a  function   of opportunistic    (fortune-seeking)    behaviour    as   opposed    to    selfless    (justice-seeking)

behaviour.207The established relationship between the Niger Delta insurgency and continuous

202UbongEssienUmoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta,” Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2015, 201.

203Tekena N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta, 1849-2009(Lagos: Stirling-Horden Publishers, 2011), 7-8.

204M. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International

Organisation 58, no. 1(2004): 35-38.

205Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford University Papers 50, no.

4(1998): 564-565; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievances in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers

56, no. 4(2004): 566-567.

206J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1(2003): 78.

207Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, no. 6 (2000): 840.

extortion on the economy reaffirms the prolific literature on the Rational Actor Theory of collective violence. The Rational Actor (RA) Theory rests upon varied economic theories. It debunks the idea that deprivation and anger were a necessary and sufficient  condition for

collective  violence,208but  rather emphasizes  both resource mobilization209   and  opportunity

structures.210

Works by Collier and Hoeffler have been crucial in highlighting economic motivation behind civil conflicts. As argued by Collier and Hoeffler, an insurgent movement can be seen as any other economic entity, people fight when it pays better than their alternative sources of income.  The  Niger  Delta  insurgency  arguably  provided  a  teeming  population  of restive youths with a paid job – insurgency. This appeared modelled after a rather violent variant of the  resource  curse  phenomenon  –  rent-seeking.211Through  the  insurgency,  youths  drew security rent from oil companies, state governors and by extension the Nigerian state.

The  “loot-seeking”  theory of  insurgency  makes  insurgency  attractive  and  viable, further extending the shelf life of any insurgency. Evidence from statistical studies on conflict duration show that conflicts taking place in regions with valuable natural resources such as

oil,   gems,   drug   cultivation,   tend   to   last   substantially   longer.212In   many   prolonged

insurgencies, insurgents have had access to early extractable natural resources. For example, insurgents in the Kachin and Shan States in Myanmar have had access to opium cultivation and  gems  stone  mines  and  they  have  been  able  to  engage  in  insurgencies  lasting  for

208J. C. Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9,  (1983): 530; M. I.  Lichbach, “An Evaluation of“Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?” Studies,” World Politics 41, no. 4(1989): 459; E. Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and Research (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1983), 36.

209J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American

Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6, (1977): 1218.

210P. K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities,” American Political Science Review

67, no. 1(1973): 23.

211Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War…, 570; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,

“Greed and Grievances in Civil War…, 570.

212J. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no.

3(2004):  279;  P.  Lujala,  “The  Spoils  of  Nature:  Armed  Civil  Conflict  and  Rebel  Access  to  Natural

Resources,”Journal of Peach Research 47, no. 1(2010): 26.

decades.213Consequently,  resource looting in the Niger Delta was a significant variable that made the insurgency last longer. It went a long way to enrich existing descriptive literature on the “oil complex,”214the “economics of war thesis,”215  the “resource curse  thesis,”216  “new war thesis”among others.

Figure 3.2: Configuration of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta as at 2007

213J. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others…, 286.

214Micheal Watts, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta,”Review of African Political Economy34 (2007): 643

215A. Ikelegbe, “Encounters of Insurgent Youth Associations with the State in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Journal of Third World Studies 22, no.1 (2005): 158.

216Elias Courson, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND): Political Marginalization…, 7.

Source: International Crisis Group (ICG) on the Niger Delta, 2008, p. 11.

Insurgents  have  a  membership,  support  and  cooperation  across  the  states   and communities that make up the Niger Delta. This provides them the opportunity and ease to network.  MEND do not have a single command  structure,  but a diverse  and  amorphous leadership  which  makes  the  movement  elusive,  but  effective  in  guerrilla  warfare.  This strategy is aimed  at avoiding  the fate  in earlier  movements  in the  region with a visible leadership such as MOSOP, and NDPVF whose leadership/top hierarchy was easily targeted

for  elimination,  or  compromised  by  the  oil  companies  and  the  government.217   MEND

operates as a guerrilla band, using local knowledge to navigate easily the intricate  creeks area. Its violent campaign against the government and the oil multinationals has been based on the tactical use of surprise attacks on strategic oil installations linked to production and exports,  secrecy surrounding  the identity of its core operators,  and a  sophisticated  media campaign.

The hydra headedness of insurgency in the region is exacerbated by the plethora of deviant insurgent groups. Such groups represent breakaway factions of mainstream insurgent groups organised around a ‘powerful’ individual linked to local power brokers, top people in

the political and military establishment, or oil companies.218  They are often organised as war-

lord based insurgents,  community and clan insurgents,  private insurgents,  cult groups  and violent street gangs. Often, they represent a slippage from popular to criminal violence or a complex mix of both, depending on expedient calculation of gain, or the disposition of the

‘warlord,’ ‘commander,’ or ‘general’ at a given point in time.219

217E. Marquardt, The Niger Delta Insurgency and its Threat to Energy Security…, 9.

218N. Duquet, “Swamped with Weapons: The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, eds., Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (London: Zed Books, 2011), 137.

219Ubong Essien Umoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta…, 173.

MEND increasingly became the symbol of Ikelegbe’s “economics of war thesis.”220

Compared to other insurgent groups that preceded it, MEND appeared to be led by more enlightened and sophisticated men.Lacking a united structure andobvious leadership, MEND appeared more of an idea than an organization, providing the franchise of violence to other insurgent groups affiliated to the struggle in the Niger Delta. Arguably, MEND’s structure was highly proficient  at leveraging on the  international  media and attracting international attention.Media    organisations    like    Sahara    Reporters,    South   African    Broadcasting Corporation,  Bloombery News,  Al-Jazeera,  the  Financial  Times of London  and the New York Times among others are part of an elite group in MEND’s listserv.

Having such an elite listserv serves several purposes.  First, the exclusivity of  the listserv made it highly coveted by media organisations, journalists, scholars and researchers. Its non-inclusivity ensured that those on the list had access to privileged information which became available to the global public after MEND carried out its attack. Second, informing subscribers  to  the  listserv  of impending  acts  increases  the  awe with which  MEND  was viewed,  particularly when those acts were carried out at  a stated time and date.MEND’s structure was also highly flexible and fluid. As argued by TemitopeOniola:

Fluidity is not necessarily quality of MEND, but it is in  fact,  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  entire insurgency  in  the  Niger  Delta.  A  few  insurgent groups   have  become   apprenticeship   schemes   for manufacturing  more insurgent  groups. The “parent” insurgent  groups  include  the  Niger  Delta  People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by AsariDokubo and Camp 5 established by Tom Polo. Also, members of one  group  of ten  migrate  to another  with  relative ease…  Individuals  typically  move  around  various groups based on reasons  ranging from  the  fame of

the group, leadership and ambition.221

220Augustine Ikelegbe, “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Nordic

Journal of African Studies14, No. 2, (2005): 220.

221Temitope B.  Oniola, Criminal Resistance? The  Politics of  Kidnapping Oil Workers (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 65.

One of the major strengths of MEND is the flow of arms to the insurgents. This has close  bearing  with  the  “commercialization  of  military  force”  in  new  wars.222   Arms  and ammunition trickled into the Niger Delta through local and international sources. Small Arms

and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation has dramatically escalated in the Niger Delta since

2003. The availability of these weapons on an unregulated international market has enabled insurgents,  criminal groups and political aspirants to further destabilize  the  fragile region. These SALWs are brought into the delta from various locations.223

The weapons vary from AK-47s, Czech SAs, Light Machine guns, Czech model 26s,

stem MK 2s, Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), MAT-49s, MG 36s, Berettas, HK G3s, FN- FALs,  home-made  guns,  pump-action,  shot  guns  and  other  sophisticated  European-made assault rifles and explosives are in the hands of insurgents in the Niger Delta.224   Most of the assault rifles-such as the Russian AK-47, the German G3, the Belgian FN-FAL, the Czech machine guns and the Serbian RPGs are supplied by illegal dealers and sellers. The sources of arms and ammunition in the Niger Delta insurgency were diverse. Some of the illegal gun dealers  are  Nigerians.   The  insurgency  also   benefited   from  the  thriving  illegal  arms

manufacturing industry in Nigeria domiciled in Awka, Onitsha and Aba.225

Insurgents bought arms from well-placed military sources in Nigeria. On February 11,

2008, five army officers, a sergeant, two corporals, six lance corporals and one private were

222In strategic literature, new wars describe international or civil wars of low-intensity conflict that involve myriad transnational connections so that the distinctions between internal and external, aggression and repression, local and global are difficult to sustain. See, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2001); See also Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2,(2004): 179; Heinz Welsch, “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars,’” Ecological Economics 67, Iss. 3 (2008):510; Jacob Mundy, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2011): 287; Gilberto Carvalho Oliveira, “‘New Wars’ at Sea: A Critical Transformative Approach to the Political Economy of Somali Piracy,” Security Dialogue 44, no. 1, (2013): 9; Andrew A. Latham and James Christenson, “Historicizing the ‘New Wars:’ The Case of Jihad in the Early Years of Islam,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3(2014): 779.

223B. Wellington, “Weapons of War in the Niger Delta,” (New York: Jamestown Foundation, 2007), 36.

224S. G. Best and Von Kemedi, “Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria,” in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, eds.,N. Florquin and E. G. Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008), 39.

225Ibid.

court-martialled for stealing arms and ammunition from army depots in Nigeria and selling them  to insurgent  groups  in the Niger  Delta.226In  October, 2006, the Rivers  State police command  arrested  Chris  Ndudi  Njoku,  a  45-year-old  businessman  who  specializes  in importing prohibited fire arms into Nigeria, and supplied to arms groups in the delta.227 As at

2004, Asari Dokubo, the leader of NDPVF, boasted of having ‘168, 000 fighters with more joining the struggle.’228  He also stated that he owned 67 boats, each armed with two light machine guns and more than 3,000 rifles. While this number cannot be adequately evaluated

beyond astute propaganda, it is evident that a large number of people are recruited into the cause.

Most of the illegal smuggling of weapons into the Niger Delta region is done through the sea. This is because Nigeria has very porous borders on both its land and sea edges which make arms trafficking from the neighbouring countries into the country easier. The smugglers use speed boats to connect with ships on the high seas, and then ferry the arms back to shore. Dokubo-Asari, leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) confirmed this method to reporters in 2005, “we are very close to  international waters, and it’s easy to get weapons

from  ships”229Over  7,000  military  assault  rifles,  sub-machine  guns  and  rocket  propelled

grenades  were  stolen  between  2003  and  2007.  Local  arm  merchants  with  established sophisticated  networks  of arms procurement  in neighbouring  countries  were  also  another source of arms for insurgents in the Niger Delta.230

Another key driver behind the proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta is the trade in

stolen oil. In 2003/2004, the practice of illegal oil bunkering boosted the acquisition of arms. It provided the armed groups with increased  financial means and better  networks,  in turn

226Nigeria Daily News, 2008.

227Human Rights News, “Soldiers, Police Seize High Calibre Riffles in Rivers,” Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) 1. no. 1 Eleme, Rivers State: 2006.

228S. G. Best and Von Kemedi, “Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria…, 42.

229Interview with Asari Dokubo, Leader of NDPVF on 20 September, 2004, The News, September 2004, 25.

230Simon Lewis, Ewa Cholewa and Stephen Davis, “Illegal Arms in the Niger Delta,” Niger Delta Peace and

Security Strategy Working Papers, November 2005.

enabling them to acquire not only more weapons but also more sophisticated  and  better- quality weapons.231  Oil bunkering has become the most profitable illegal private business in Nigeria. Under the Nigerian constitution, all minerals, oil and gas in Nigeria  belong to the

federal government. Oil extraction outside the frame work of an agreement with the federal government  is illegal.  Bunkering  is the  illegal tapping of oil pipelines  and  wellheads  to siphon off crude oil. The oil is then sold to foreign buyers or bartered for small arms.232

There has been a link between arms supply and crude oil theft. This is known  in

technical  parlance  as oil-for-weapons  swap.  The availability  of crude oil,  which runs  in largely unsecured pipelines, provide insurgents in the Niger Delta high value  resources to support their activities. This black market trade in crude oil has been identified to be highly lucrative and has enabled the various insurgent groups in the Niger Delta to be remarkably self-sufficient.  Increasingly,  in the Delta region, illegal oil bunkering by armed groups has provided an important source of funding and small arms to groups. Asari openly admits to funding his group through the sale of stolen oil, claiming that he is just taking back what has

been stolen from the Ijaw people.233  Large quantities of stolen oil are loaded into barges, and

transported through the Delta waterways to ships and oil tankers waiting on the high seas.234

Oil bunkering finances arms acquisition either directly as part of payment for the stolen oil or indirectly by providing security services for oil bunkering operations.

Other  key players  in  the  proliferation  of  SALW  in  the  Niger  Delta  are  the  oil companies operating in the region. Allegedly a number of small arms were transferred to the

Niger Delta after the government decided that oil companies should be allowed to  import

231N. Duquet, “Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta,”

International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 2 (2009): 173.

232Human Rights Watch, The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence…, 17.

233Florquin, Nicolas and Eric Berman, eds. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security…,

338.

234A. Ikelegbe “The Economy of Conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria,” Nordic Journal of

African Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 222.

weapons for the supernumerary police force (SPY) protecting oil infrastructure.235  Financial resources from oil companies have been used by the armed groups to acquire weapons. The practice of oil companies awarding surveillance and security contracts has fuelled violence in the region,  not only by providing  insurgents  with sufficient  financial  means  to purchase weapons,  but also by encouraging  competition  between  rival groups for contracts.  These

contracts  have  also  encouraged  other  youths  from  other  communities  to  actually  start sabotaging  infrastructure  in  order  to  receive  similar  “stay-at-home  payments.”236   Paying ransom  for kidnapped  employees  is another  way oil companies  have  facilitated  weapons

procurements by armed groups. Over the years, members of staff of oil companies and their contractors have increasingly become the target of kidnapping attempts.

The Deployment of the Nigerian Military in the Niger Delta

In Nigeria, one of the core interests of the national defence objectives is to  ensure territorial integrity and national security.237  National security provides conditions  in which citizens enjoy free, peaceful and safe environment, devoid of crisis Section 14 (2) (b) of the

1999 constitution of Nigeria states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”238

Consequently,  the constitution  empowered  the Nigeria Police to maintain law  and order in Nigeria.  However, since internal crises affect national security, Section 217 (2) (c) of the 1999 Constitution, mandates the Armed Forces “to suppress insurrection and act in aid

of Civil Authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to

235Jennifer M. Hazen and Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,”An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey (Switzerland: The Small Arms Survey Geneva, 2007), 39.

236K. Omeje, “Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” Current Sociology 54 no. 3

(2006):  454.

237An interview with Lt. Col. D. Y. Danja Joint Task Force Headquarters Opolu, Yenegoa on   22/12/2013.

238Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 CAP. C23 L.F.N.

the Act of the National Assembly.”239  In line with this provision, the Federal Government of Nigeria had on several occasions, called out the military during crises situations.  The use of the military to manage the crises in the Niger Delta region was first in 1966 when it quelled Isaac Boro’s attempted secession.240  Again, during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the

Nigerian military under the Third Marine Commando carried out military operations in the

area.241   Since then, the Nigerian military has been called upon intermittently to restore order in the Niger Delta and has increasingly carried out internal security roles in the area.242

Since  1999,  sections  of  the  Nigerian   military  have  remained   through   active deployment  in the Niger Delta.  However,  between  1999 and 2009, the  operations  of the Nigerian  military underwent  significant  changes  over time.  Between  1999  and 2003,  the Nigerian military deployed to the Niger Delta were mostly engaged in stemming the tide of inter-ethnic and inter-gang conflicts. Towards the close of 2003, the Nigerian military were grouped  under  the  Joint  Task  Force  with  the  mandate  to  secure  oil infrastructures  and personnel of oil companies from the ethnic and gang violence that had engulfed a significant part of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. From 2006 onwards, the Nigerian military assumed a more  kinetic  posture  as  the  activities  of  MEND  went  uncontrollable  and  global.  More offensive operations were recorded  by the Nigerian military with its attendant unintended consequences.

The Nigerian Military and Defensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2003-2005

Between 2003 and 2005, the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta carried out a rather defensive kind of counterinsurgency. While force was applied, it was not completely kinetic

239Ibid.

240I. T. Sampson “Niger Delta Militancy: Causes, Origins and Dimensions,” African Security ReviewInstitute for

Security Studies18 no. 2 (2008): 31.

241C. I. Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict…,

105.

242D. Adeyemo, and L. Olu–Adeyemi, “Amnesty in a Vacuum: The Unending Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. In Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, eds., Victor Ojakorotu and Lysias Dodd Gilbert (Germany:Lap Lambert Academic Publishers, 2010),6.

in approach. The NDPVF led by Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and NDV led by Ateke Tom were both formed in July 2003 respectively, signaling the geographic expansion of the insurgency. On September  27, 2004, Asari threatened  to launch an “all-out war” in  the Niger Delta, sending shock waves through the oil industry–unless  the  federalgovernment  ceded greater control of the region’s vast oil resourcestothe Ijaw people, the majority ethnic nationality in theNiger Delta. The threat, made by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), followed  the deployment offederal government troops to quell months of intense fighting  between the NDPVFand  a rival armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom.

Following the attacks by Asari’s NDPVF on Port Harcourt at the end ofAugust 2004, Rivers  Governor  Peter  Odili  requested  the  intervention  of  the  federal  government.  On September 4, 2004, President Obasanjo approved Operation Flush Out 3, a joint operation comprising the Nigerian army, navy, air force and police.243During Operation Flush Out 3 in September 2004, troops and police were again deployed  to  Amadi-Ama,  Tombia, Okrika, Buguma,  Bukuma, Ogbakiri,  and several other  areas.  With the use of military helicopter gunships, widespread destruction of homes and the death of local people and fighters were

recorded.244

Previously in August 2003, the federal government  officially drafted  a Joint  Task Force (JTF) made up of the three arms of the military under a military campaign code named “Operation Restore Hope” to curb the restiveness  in the Niger Delta. Its  mandate among others was to secure oil installations, curb oil community agitation and neutralize any threat to the oil industry. This mandate was restricted to three states in the Niger Delta that were the hot bed of insurgency: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. These three states made up Sectors I,

243Human Rights Watch(HRW), Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State, February,

2005.

244Ibid.

II and III in the Federal counterinsurgency effort.245The three services – Army, Navy and Air

Force – of the Nigerian military deployed operated across their traditional environment.

The Nigerian Army were not restricted to land operations but were fully integrated into marine warfare in an amphibious dimension. The Navy and Air Force components of the Nigerian military deployed to the Niger Delta were also involved in joint patrol cordon and search on land with the Army component. Indeed, the Army and  the Navy seemed to have operated  in a tapestry at both the  tactical and technical  levels although  their  roles were distinguished at the operational and strategic levels. Men of the Nigerian Army were known to operate boats and carry out exclusive naval  tasks. It was the Air Force that appeared to operate somewhat independently at the tactical and technical level but not at the operational,

strategic and policy levels.246

The Army commitment was one infantry battalion assigned. The Nigerian Army had three ground combat units – armour, artillery and infantry. The Nigerian Army contributed the largest number of forces for the JTF ORH. For land operations, the  three sectors were manned by the Brigade HQ of the Nigerian Army stationed  in  Effurun, Delta state.Upon

inception, each sector of JTF ORH had three units made up of about 700 men.247Within Delta

state  Area  of  Responsibility   (AOR)  were  the  maritime   assets  of  NNS  Delta,   FOB ESCRAVOS, FOB IGBOKODA and air asset of 81 AMG of the NAF. Within Bayelsa state AOR were themaritime asset of FOB FORMOSO and 97 SOG; while Rivers state AOR made use of the maritime and air assets of NNS PATHFINDER and FOB BONNY.248

For   the   Nigerian    Navy   (NN),    the   Eastern    Naval   Command    (ENC)    in

Calabarcontrolled  196 nautical miles of coastline, out of which 70 miles was within Rivers

State, and the remaining 126 miles was shared by Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Cross  River

245UbongEssienUmoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta…, 213.

246Ibid 268.

247“Joint Task Force set up to Restore Order in the Niger Delta,” The Nation(September 2003): 4.

248Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Navy Order, NNO/04, 2004; Emma Amaize, “Oil Bunkering: Their Dare Devil Plot, Governments Counter Moves,” Vanguard, September 20, 2003.

states respectively.249The  ENC had two ships, NNS PATHFINDER  in Port Harcourt  and NNS VICTORY in Calabar. The ENC maintained naval bases in all the Delta coastal states, except Bayelsa. In Bayelsa, the NN had only one forward operation base (FOB), located in Egweama.250The Western Naval Command (WNC) area of responsibility (AOR) lay between

the border with the Benin Republic and longitude 6o  E while the ENC’s AOR lay between

longitude  6o   E  and  the  borders  with  Cameroon,  Equatorial  Guinea  and  Sao  Tome  and Principe.251  At the tactical level of operations, the Nigerian Navy deployed numerous small patrol craft, such as, Navy SBS commandos and Defender Rapid  Response Boats (RRBs), capable  of operating  in the shallows  of the Delta waterways  and creeks.  The Air Force commitment  had developed  to five operational  Mi-35  attack  helicopters  stationed  at Port Harcourt and the four lift helicopters stationed at Benin City in Edo State.252

Figure 3.3: Navy SBS Commando Boat

Source: http://www.JTF ORHnigerdeltaphoto_gallery_picture_archives.com. Accessed on April 26,

2014

The Nigerian Military and Offensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2006-2009

249“Navy Reiterate Readiness to Ensure Waterways Safety,” The Tide OnlineJuly 22, 2007; “RSG to Assist

Navy Fight Criminality in N’Delta,”The Tide Online July 22, 2007.

250“Sylva Urges Navy to Increase Presence in Bayelsa,” The Tide OnlineAugust 27, 2007.

251Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Navy Order, NNO/04, 2004.

252John Ogbedu and Bolaji Ogundele, “Nigerian Military No Match for Militants,” The Nigerian Village Square, March 19, 2007; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Fight for Nigeria Oil to Continue,” June 15, 2007.

By 2006,  the  posture  of the  Nigerian  military  in the  Niger  Delta  took  a  kinetic dimension. This was in response to the lethal dimension MEND insurgency assumed in the Niger Delta. As argued by Inuawa, the Nigerian military under the umbrella of the JTF was initially tasked to secure oil installations and facilities, but combating armed militants was added to its mandate in 2006 as the situation worsened and more aggressive insurgent groups

like MEND emerged.253On February 15, 2006, military helicopter gunships were deployed to

Okerenkoko in Delta State (stronghold of MEND insurgents) carried out aerial bombardment extending into Perezuoweikorigbene, Ukpogbene and Seitorububor, in Gbaramatu clan, Delta state.254   MEND  responded  swiftly  by  attacking  the  Forcados  oil  export  terminal  and wreakinghavoc  on the facility,  taking  nine expatriate  hostages  in what  appeared  to be a retaliation for the attack on Gbaramantu.

Figure 3.4: Mi 35 Helicopter Gunship

Source: http://www.jtf_orhnigerdeltaphoto_gallery_picture_archives.com. Accessed on April 26,

2014

In April 20, 2006, MEND extended its attack into the cities in the Niger Delta  by

detonatingtwo bombs: one in Port Harcourt (Bori camp military barrack), and the other at a

253MuhammatNuraInuwa, “Oil  Politics and  National Security in  Nigeria,  MA  Thesis,  Naval  Postgraduate

School, Monterey, California, 2010, 165.

254International Crisis Group (ICG), “Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report, no. 123 (March 28, 2006): 11.

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