A BTRACT
Rive hundred randomly sampled users of English as a Second Language (ESL) are tested on the verb to determine their competence in the use of its various paradigms. The population is drawn from the first year students of Imo State University, Oigwe. The five hundred multiple choice/objective questions constructed for the test are grouped into five areas to cover tne main areas of the verb as follows:
(II) the tenses 91 questions
(iv) concord 122 II and
(v) verbal idiosyncrasy – 100 questions.
Three hypotheses are then formulated to guide the study as follows: iypothesis One: he population understands and competently uses the restrictions on the English verb; riypothresis Two: The population shall score a competency mean in any test on the verb.
vi.
i tiypothesis Three: Deviation from the competency mean shall be insignificant. Before undertaking the study, our readings had pointed to the verb as an area of critical need in ESL pedagosy. Our survey of literature tended to confirm that ESL scholars had hitherto failed to devote the necessary attention and research to verb studies. Consequently, we waded into a competency based study of learners’ verb errors, setting a competency mean for the group. The overall mean, as well as the mean of each division of the verb does not permit us to accept the first two hypotheses. However, hypothesis three is accepted. A hierarchy of difficulty is posited. he users’ grammar shows less familiarity with the selec• tional restrictions on the verb than we ever anticipated. The pattern of errors and their types are shown, section by section, with implications for pedagogical goals and recommendations for future researchers.
278
CHAPTER ONE
ER«OR IN CUUNIUAT LON
1.1 Introduction
Language is a very difficult term to define, and attempts at definition have swung, iike the pendulum, into two extremes, ht one extreme the view 1s held that every imaginable phenomenon has its own language, hus the language of bad weather is different from the language of good weather. The language of a good environment is differ• ent from the language of a filthy environment. The bees of the high trees, the domesticated animals (dogs, cats, and goats, for example) and even the wild animals of the forest
have their respective languages, Motivated by these conside•
rations, those who hoid the view that language is any mode of communication see it as a manner of communication not exclusive to man (homo sapiens) for, according to Lenneberg
(1968:35), “the fact that man communicates with man is not
a unique zoological phenomenon. lost animals have inter and 1ntraspecies communication systems and among mammals there is usually vocal communication”. At another extrene, however, people view language as a defining characteristic of being human, ln their view, we are, therefore,
“language-using animals” (Mc”rthur, 1983:9).
2.
This restrictive view of language is concerned with a
system which has creative potential in the depth of its
thought and the intricacy of communication. The view is concerned with an intricately organised phenomenon which is exclusively used by man in his own society. Words like ‘arbitrary’, ‘conventional’, ‘vocal’, and somewhat recently in the continuum of human experience,
‘written’ are used in describing this human enterprise. Whichever model we adopt, we shall never fail to accept the common denominator that language is used for commu• nication. In this study, however, we shall adopt the
model which views language as a “defining characteristic
of being human.
In some human societies, the language used may be fairly uniform. Such societies, usually described as unilingual, have little or no problems of interpersonal communicationj for everyone understands what every other person says, certain idiosyncracies·in speech and manner• isms notwithstanding. Bn@land is one example of a lan• uage communi ty that has remained. unilingual down the course of its history. Except for about two hundred
ears when the Normans administered the affairs of that country and caused French to be used as the official language, England has managed to speak English from the
days when the Anglo–Saxons defeated the Celts and took
3.
over their land to the present. Unfortunately, not all countries or societies are linguistically homogeneous like England. There are some countries or societies, like Nigeria which is a classical example, born out of political expediency but which do not speak only one language within their borders. Some of such countries may impose laws that delineate the use and functions of the languages available in the, and the emergent lingua franca becomes a child of circumstances, politically and legally adopted to facilitate communication and avoid chaos. If such countries fail to adopt such laws they face enormous problems of communication depending on the
multiplicity of the languages available in them. A solu• tion may come if, and only if a more powerful language manages to lodge itself as a second language among the entire citizenry. Such, indeed, is the case with Nigeria,
Nigeria is a heterogeneous language community with
an odd estimate of four hundred languages spoken through•
out its geographical spread (Tiffen, 1968:65; Greenberg,
1971:2448; Bamgbose, 1970:56; Hansford et al, 1976:5,8,22). Colonial history and records show that English made a belated entry into the country. However, propelled by legislation, education, socio-economic and political considerations, English gained wide acceptance such that
h
it has become for all Nigerians the language of formal education, government and the law, Under such circum• stances, no one could stop Pnglish fromuecoming what it is today in iiigeria, namely, a second language, It is against this background of a multilingual society which lacks a lingua franca that ±ngtish is thriving and enjoying a far more territorial spread and acceptance than any one of the indigenous languages used in
Nigeria. Differing varieties of that language, corres• ponding more or less with performance skills, and competence are typified by the classroom, the law courts, government affices, the soap box, the hospitals and the
patois of the market place, At one extreme is the
language at its finesse (acrolect) and at the other extreme is the language at its iost perjured form (basilect). “e know that there is a perpetual inter• mingling of these varieties in real communication situations out this tends to lead more to debasement than to refinement or amelioration, Ready evidence is found in pidgin and in the numerous varieties of sub• standard English spoken and written throughout the country. One fact stands out clearly in the use of
English in Nigeria, Whether in its most preured form or at its finesse, whether as pidgin or as slang, English is used for communication in the country where
5
its absence would have meant chaos,
,,
1 .c English For onnication In Nigeria
The use of English for counication in ivigeria is
an extended view of English as a second language in the country. The multiplicity of ethnic languages having created a difficult situation, only English in its numerous varieties can be used for interpersonal interaction across the country. ommunication needs arise when two persons meet each other in the streets and each has to murmur some• thing to the other as a sign of friendship. In ore specific contexts, communication needs arise when a trader
goes out to buy or to sell his wares, when a stranger
has lost his way in a cosmopolitan city and when we must
give directions or receive instructions to promote knowledge, assuage feelings and engender mutual trust, Communication, therefore, ueans social intercourse, his social inter• course is inhibited when there is no common language to
fall back to. In the Nigerian situation unhappy ethnic distrust had been tne bane and people therefore welcome the relief which inglish offers. Accordingly, ‘ngiish is
used to express the intentions of the users, to transfer
meaning where, because of differences, a
local language aw
therefore,
cannot be used, and to adjust feelings.
It is» ]
serving
tn e
6.
communicative functions of judgement, suasion, argument,
rational inquiry, personal emotion and emotional rela• tions which, like other languages, it expresses. Littlewood (1981:6-8) suggests in four broad domains
those skills which must be recognised as relating to a person’s communicative competence and which, even in a second language situation, are no less important. These
are;
1.a high degree of linguistic competence, The suggestion is made that the language user must skillfully manipulate the linguistic system so as to be able to use it spontaneously and also flexibly in order to express his intended message;
2. ability to distinguish the linguistic forms from the communicative functions which they perform. It is one thing to master a linguistic unit, and quite another thing to link it to communication. In this domain, therefore, the language user must understand as part of a communicative system those items which he has mastered as a linguistic system. A language
like Latin is dead today because people who mastered its linguistic system (declension of nouns, conjugation of verbs, and all the
27. paradigms of grammar) could not use those items in communicative situations;
5. the learner must develop skills and strategies
for using language to communicate meanings a8 effectively as possible in concrete situations. The specific expectation here is that he must learn to use feedback to evaluate his own success and to correct failure where necessary;
+. the learner must become aware of the social
meaning of language forms. Specifically, this domain requires the learner to be able to use the generally acceptable forms and to avoid potentially offensive ones.
Summing it up, Littlewood (1981:8) opines that “the
criterion for success (in communication) is therefore
not so much whether he has managed to convey an intended meaning but rather whether he has produced an acceptable piece of language”. (Bracket is mine).
we may now appreciate the fact that language use
has two main aspects, judging from the foregoing. These
are:
(a) the abstract knowledge of the language system, and (b) the practical ability to translate this know•
ledge to real communicative situations.
Of course, this neat categorisation cannot show the
8.
various aspects of each skill. or example, the first one is a cognitive activity which depends on a number of factors which are themselves not static. These
factors include: motivation, intelligence, opportunity, etc. The second factor also depends on some variables which are not always available. For example, if the target language is English, there may always be oppor• tunities to use it in real communicative situations. This may be an overstatement but it contrasts with
French in Nigeria. People may learn French, know its
linguistic forms but ay never find the opportunity to use it in a real communicative set up. Once this oppor• tunity is lacking, the feedback specified in No. 3
domain above is impossible to achieve and the law of diminishing returns will overtake the learner and his target language.
The more we consider the learner’s need to trans•
late his knowledge to real communicative situations the more we discover that the learner is a potential contri• butor to the linguistic enterprise – he is potentially
creative in the use of his language (first or second language). He is by no means a passive recipient of an old and an unchanging order but an active contributor to a dynamic and ever novel phenomenon, At one extreme of
this phenomenon, there are the rules of the code which
9.
he must internalise cognitively and draw from as the
need arises, This rule of the code helps him to use the language like every other person who uses that
language with him, thus making for mutual intelligibility and, as we have seen, “an acceptable piece of language”, At another extreme there are his own strategies and contributions in the art of communication or language
use proper. Here, he becomes himself, different from other users of the language as he decides for himself the words to choose, the themes to emphasise and even how he orders the structure of his utterance.
These two aspects of language in a communicative
set up are not new to linguists. By 1911, for example, Ferdinand de Saussure had been discussing the concepts of ‘langue’, an abstract system (or the language), and
‘parole’ the physical product of a linguistic act. The language is a highly systematic and rule governed phenomenon but the concrete act, although drawn from
the language, is not always a perfect mirror as it is
subject to the vicissitudes of the moment. Implicit in de Saussure’s observations, or at least remotely traceable to his logic are the two aspects which we have more categorically stated as the knowledge of the rules on the one hand and the creative use of these
rules in communication, on the other hand. About 100 B.C.,
Dionysius hr ax, an Alexandrian turned into Greek
10.
language scholar, had also made a treatise in which he distinguisied between “the technical knowledge of the language ·,,” on the one hand, and “a combination of words ··, making complete senue” on the other (drawn from cArthur, 1985:4+9). In raceut times, Chomsky has been elaborately explaining that there is u clear distinction between ‘copetence’ – tie tacit knowledge of the language and ‘performance’ the physical pcoduct of the linguistic act (aosky, 1965:4+). Explaining these concepts, lromkin and loan (1978:7) state:
••• there is a difference between navin tie nacessury knowledge to produce .., sentences and the way we use tuis nowiedge when we are pe:forming linguistic]l. It is a difference oetween what one nows, which linguists refer to £ oe’a LinucEte competence, and how one uses tnis knowledge in actual benaviour, which
{Salted linguistic performance” (emphasis not
mine).
ince tne language user dwells in, as it wer@, two worlds; the world or Knowledge governed by olstract rules and tne world or performance governed by the rule of tne thumo, it is not without reason
that we expect a typical communicative situation to be
an attempt to strike a compromise between the two. l’here are two possible approaches. On the one nand, the language user may be using the rules that he has
known to meet his communicative needs. In this case
11.
he always restricts his communication to the ‘few‘ rules he is familiar with and avoids those rules with which
he is not familiar. On the other hand, the language
user may be using his communicative needs and situations which arise spontaneously to experiment on the rules whether he knows them or not. Some of the rules will, therefore, be learnt posteriori by trial and error; afterall that is actually how a child acquires his language. He even makes some rules himself by extending,
sometimes in error, the application of the rules he has mastered. Consequently, linguists observe that every communicative situation is guided by two rules from the language user’s point of view. These rules are called: the expression rules and the reference rules.
The expression rules are those rules and strategies or techniques which govern what the learner or the language user actually does with language. It was Widdowson (1978:15) who articulated the nature of this rule. The learner, he notes, will always “adopt the noral communicative strategy of simplification”. This strategy will require him “to behave like a nomal human being and develop expression rules to facilitate commu• nication. Expression rules have become known as the rules of normal communication used by the language
learner to test the rules of the language which he is using and to achieve fluency. Language use requires fluency which manifests itself at both the receptive
and the productive levels. At the productive level,
12.
which we are concerned with, fluency may take the form of filling the time with talk, the quality of such talk being less important than the quantity. It may also
take the form of talking coherently with adequate mastery
of the semantic and syntactic paraphernalia of the lan• guage. It may, again, take the form of being able to say something on a wide range of situations and topics.
Finally, it may take the form of being creative and original in language use. Brumfit (1984:56) is of the view that “fluency ••• is to be regarded as natural
language use, whether or not it results in native•
speaker-like language comprehension or production”. Consequently, expression rules and fluency rules converge and many linguists see them as one and the same thing, their emphasis being not so much on a knowledge of the rules as on the ability to perform in a communicative situation. The language learner is put into positions where he is forced by the demands of the situation to
use the language fluently and creatively. The teacher‘s
role then is reduced and, by implication, lapses or
errors are not immediately attacked as this would disrupt
fluency. Thus, concerning errors which occur, “correction should have either no place, or a very
13.
minor place, in fluency work, for it normally distracts
from the messago, or may even be perceived as rude.
In fact (….), error will be an inevitable part of the process ” (rumrit, 19844:56-57). We shall return to the question of error in due course in this chapter but suffice it to note that in normal communicative situa• tions, we are using both the expression and the fluency rules which have the potential of error occurrence.
The second rule is called the reference or sometimes the accuracy rule. The impression must not be given that fluent language is bereft of accuracy. However, refer-• ence rules characterise the learner’s knowledge as much
as the expression rules characterise his performance in the continuum of the language phenomena already explored above; langue versus parole; technical knowledge versus word combination; competence versus performance respect• ively. he accuracy rule is marked by mental and peda-•
&ogical orientation which makes language learning or use different from an ordinary communicative situation where fluency features prominently. Thus, ••• any language activity which is not being carried on with the learners apparently operating in the same way as they do in
natural, mother-tongue use is an accuracy activity”. (Brumrit, 1984:52-53).
14.
As we would imagine, therefore, accuracy would relate to language learning with a grammar focus, the type
which brings the teacher in a conspicuous position ready
to ‘interrupt’ and to ‘correct’ the learner, thus impeding
fluency. It would also pertain to error identification
~
in cases where the reference rules or rules of the code have been infringed upon and the mental set of the learner has to be drawn to the accurate pattern. We must note, therefore, that both fluency and accuracy have methodo• logical implications which we must consider.
1.5 Considerations Of Methodics
Indeed, both accuracy/reference rules on the one hand and the expression/fluency rules on the other are methodological questions. In the course of language learning and teaching, methods have succeeded one another at a speed that makes people describe it as a swing of
the pendulum. However, we can rightly say that the polarity has been between the mentalists and the realists or still the sane, between the cognitivists and the naturalists respectively. In modern language pedagogy, the cognitivists follow the cognitive code-learning
method while the naturalists follow the communicative teaching method. We briefly examine each in turn.
1.3\ The Cognitive Code Learning Method
15.
The cognitive code learning method has been properly explained by Carroll (1966:104+-105). Originally, it was viewed by many as a modified version of the grammar• translation method. However, false impressions about it have been modified in view of its being derived from Gestalt psychology and transformational linguistics. Carroll emphasises those psychological theories upon whose principles the method has been founded. These are that;
(1) the frequency with which an item is contrasted
with other items is more important than frequency of repetition.
)
(2) the more meaningful the materials with which the student works, the greater the facility
of retention.
(5) materials pre’ sented visually are more easily learned than comparable materials presented
aurally, and
(4+) conscious attention to critical features and
understanding of them will facilitate learning. The cognitive code-learning method emphasises a
conscious, or cognitive control and learning of the
structures or rules of the taret language as a way of attaining mastery. In its view, too, the contrastive features of both the target and the source languages must
be considered, and indeed presented to the learner, for
16.
little is served by presenting those features which pose no difficulty to the learner. Also, placing little or no emphasis on choral repetition and patterned drills, the learning tasks of the cognitive code-learning method are presented in meaningful situations as visual, rather than as aural items only. The more difficult a learning task poses, the greater the conscious attention paid to it, and its rules internalised. he assumption is that the more the learner has a cognitive control over the structures
of the language the more he will develop facility with the use of the language in meaningful situations. Thus, a conscious (or ‘cognitive’) study and knowledge of the rules of grammar (“code-learning”) have become the sign
posts of the new ethod and these are deemed to be better
than uere habituation through repetition and patterned drills.
It is not surprising to find that the cognitive code•
learning method has been favourably received by transform• ational linguists who view language as an abstract and a rule-governed system, who insist on the innovative aspect of language, and who attach no particular importance to
the pre-eminence of speech over writing. Indeed, the aim
is to increase the learner’s repertory of choices among
the various patterns and to impart a sensitivity to the
17.
meaning of patterns by consciously internalising the rules.
When transformational linguists talk of competence, they
are referring to this knowledge of the rules of the language as different from the use of language. In Ghomsky’s words, the transformational linguists insist that there is:
“… a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)” (Chomskey, 1965:4).
he cognitive code-learning method is thus linked with Chmskyian linguistics, and our assessment of this method shows decidedly that work done under it has overtones of
the accuracy (or reference) rules syndrome. .Because of its emphasis on contrastive studies, the cognitive code-learning method has also been linked with contrastive analysis in linguistics, the purpose of which is to stop the learner
from committing an error. In this case, errors are to be
~
avoided at all costs.
1.52 The Communicative Method
The communicative method for its part is mainly concerned with how to develop creative outlets in the learners, It is, therefore, focused on the learner’s originality and individuality as a way of removing stereo-• typed thinking in second language learners. Since the classroom is naturally formal and artificial, the method
18. advocates the injection of human warmth in order that the learners may participate freely in exchanging ideas in situations which simulate real-life communicative situa• tions. Such should depict “the way the demeanor, gestures, word choice, tone, and inflection of one person affects
the other – and vice versa” (Shane et al, 1962:31). In the
communicative method, meaning is the over-riding factor. The learner must try first to get his meaning across before attention can be paid or shified to the mechanism· of structure. If a quasi-drill situation is used at the early stages, it is to usher the learner into a conversa• tion situation, give him greater freedom in answering questions and discussing topics, and finally engender in
him the sill of free communication and social interaction,
Dobson (1979:2) describes such an approach as “the back•
bone of a language course based~_on language functions or speech acts rather than on units of grammar or situations with a granmar focus”.
The communicative method recognises that errors
should be expected (many times, in fact, tolerated) in the communicative process. These errors are not unique for, even in first language acquisition, they also occur. Decidedly, therefore, this method underlies the expression (or fluency) rules which we discussed above as much as the
I
cognitive code-learning method underlies the accuracy (reference) rules, each pair of which we had called a methodological question. It is, thus, clear that at one polarity of the methodological question, errors are to be avoided and at another polarity they are to be expected (even tolerated). If this 1s so, we need to examine closely the nature of tne learner’s (user’s) errors in he context of second language learning.
1.l Theory_ of Error
Every error is regarded as “a systeinatic deviation fro the target language by a non-native speaker” (iiead• bloom, 1979:28). The word ‘systematic’ is used in the literature to imply “not just random” but also “predict• able“ (Corder, 1973:259). A lot of terminological inconsistency is noticeable in tne literature. For example, Headbloom (1979:28) uses ‘error’, ‘goof’,
‘deviant or erroneous production’ to “imply the same notion”, and ‘mistakes’, ‘slips of the tongue’, ‘stutters’, oversights in writing’ to imply minor, random or non• systematic shortfall in the native speaker’s speech or language since even native speakers are occasionally
prone to these.tnings. ~order (1973:259), on tis own part, applies the word ‘mistake’ in his reference to both
20.
the systematic errors of learners and the random lapses
of native speakers, McArthur (1983:107-108), like Corder, uses the word ‘mistakes’ to mean both errors and lapses
but he goes ahead to create a distinction between
competence mistakes” on the one hand and “performance mistakes” on the other. Competence mistakes are those which “arise from a genuine failure to understand and master a systematic element in the target language, The student just does not know what to do ·..”, Performance fistakes arise when “the student knows very well what he
or she should have done, but through nervousness, tiredness, pressure, the effects of inner translation (…) just
lapsed and ‘forgot’ for a moment what to do”. In this study we shall regard errors as the systematic deviation from the acceptable standard, and mistakes as the random (not so significant) shortfall in performance after the manner of Headbloom. Errors, therefore, represent the inability of the learner to produce the acceptable forms of his target language due to his failure to know or
internalise the rules of the code. There is no other way
for us to assess the learner’s knowledge of his target language except by evaluating his performance – by analy• sing the physical product of his linguistic act; and when we do so, we are bound to find evidence of poorly applied
21.
rules or evidence of a systematic violation of the refer• ence rules. To the extent that these are manifest, to that extent, we may claim that the learner is steeped in errors.
There are two views of errors which must be explained in order that our understanding of the nature and place of errors in second language pedagogy may be the better enhanced. One view of errors is that they are facilitative. The other view is that they are inhibitory (Headbloom,
1979:28).
The view that errors are facilitative stems from an analysis of first language acquisition process. In the first language acquisition, the child commits errors not necessarily as a faulty version of the target language or as evidence of interference from another language but as
a transitional competence arising from his efforts to con•
struct and reconstruct the rules of his language. In other words, he is actively and creatively processing, testing, comparing, and over-generalising the rules from the lang• uage data available to him. ilis errors, in this process, are not anathema; on the contrary they are facilitative in the sense that they help him to quicken the momentum of language mastery by, as it were, trial and error. Accord•
ing to this view, the second language learner is very much
like the child who is acquiring his mother tongue. A
22.
study of his language shows also that he is actively and creatively processing the data of his target language like the child and is, therefore, liable to construct, reconstruct, test, compare and generalise some rules of his target language quite apart from his own mother tongue. In this process, errors must occur just as they must for the child and since they helped the child to acquire his language, they may, as well, help the adult
learner to master his target language. Littlewood (19844:25)
supports this view, noting that: “Errors of this ••• type (often called intralingual) are often similar to those produced by the child in the mother tongue and suggest that the second language learner is employing similar strategies, notably generalisation and simplification.”
He thus almost wholly echoes Headbloom (1979:28-29) who
observes that:
According to this view, errors are regarded as potentially facilitative •.• in the learning process. The second language learner is thought to be much like the first language learner in that he uses errors to test hypotheses about the language, thereby learning from them.
This view of errors has its merits and demerits.
As we noted above in our discussion of the fluency rules, communication fluency is couched on the premise that the teacher should exert minimum (if any) interruption on the
OF NEE!
IA 23.
learner. Implicitly, he should tolerate errors in order
to achieve fluency and encourage participation. The merit of this attitude is that it encourages “a pedagogy of participation” instead of a “pedagogy of imposition” (Hawkes, 1979:21). No longer scared by the teacher’s scrutinisation of his output (for errors), the learner can now attempt to be even creative in his language. On the other hand, there is also a possible demerit in tolerating errors just to encourage participation and fluency. One major demerit is that the learner may never know that he has erred and the attendant error may so persist as to be fossilised.
The other view of errors is that they are inhibitory. This view of errors spring from the traditional method of language teaching and consequently characterises most of the mentalist or cognitive approaches to language teaching and learning. This has dominated language teaching atti• tudes until recently. Errors are seen as a faulty version of the target language possibly derived fro the interfe• rence of mother tongue on the target language. Thus, the idea of interference not only explains but also reinforces the fear that errors inhibit language learning. They are therefore signs of failure and as such should not be wil• lingly tolerated. Like the novice, the second language learner must conform rigidly to the good habits of the
24. second language and should shun the corruptive influence of the mother tongue habits no matter how strong it is.
We know how strong that influence is. In the words of
McArthur (1985:81): “The home language has already shaped both mind and mouth, and interferes with the acquisition of any alternative system which is a kind of competition”. This kind of language error is said to be an interlanguage error. In the view of those who uphold the theory under consideration, errors therefore inhibit second language learning and so must be avoided a priori. We may note that just as the former view is linked with fluency rules, so in fact this view is linked with the accuracy rules. Work based on the need to check errors fro occurring is known to be accuracy work.
The two views which we have briefly explained have, to a large extent, shaped the approaches used by applied linguists in treating the question of errors. On the one hand, we have linguists wao do not mind errors, who regard the as facilitative and who order their syllabus from an inventory of errors that have already occurred. On the other hand, we have linguists who do not want errors to
occur at all and who plan to nip them in the bud. The two
.,,
approaches mark the difference between linguistics
posteriori and linguistics ~ priori, or between error analysis and contrastive analysis respectively. While the
25.
former is called the weak hypothesis, the latter is said to be the strong (or predictive) hypothesis. We need to elucidate each of these hypotheses briefly.
1.5 The strong And The leek [iypotheses
Each of these hypotheses is an approach in the study of learners’ errors, the difference between them being the point of attack.
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